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Examples of Long-Term And Short-Term Decision-Making in the UK, Delaware and 
Germany- Gap-Filling Exercise in the Context of the Shareholder v. Stakeholder Debate 
and Share Ownership Structure of the Company 
Katarzyna Chalaczkiewicz-Ladna1 
Abstract 
This paper explores the extent to which the law in the UK, Delaware and Germany imposes 
an obligation on directors of solvent public companies to take into account the long-term 
consequences of their decisions while establishing the content and scope of long-termism in 
these three legal systems. This research draws on the academic literature and performs a gap-
filling exercise by identifying examples of long-term decision-making in these jurisdictions, 
as well as examples of decision-making and conduct that is not long-term in nature. In the 
gap-filling exercise, case studies are presented in the context of (i) the contemporary 
shareholder v. stakeholder debate in corporate governance scholarship and (ii) the relevance 
of the share ownership structure of the company. These two important debates are used as 
variables to cast light on the ambit of the notion of long-termism, and the structural 
differences and similarities between the corporate governance systems and concepts of long-
termism in the UK, Delaware and Germany.  
 
1. Introduction 
Consideration of the relevance of the long-term and short-term consequences of corporate 
decision-making is still very much on the agenda on the both sides of the Atlantic. Short-
termism generally refers to a tendency to overvalue short-term rewards and gains, which 
leads to an under-appreciation of long-term value creation,2  for example, investments in 
research. In principle, primary legislation and soft law encourage long-termism in some shape 
or form; however, they do not offer much guidance on how the role of long-term interests in 
the decision-making processes of company directors should be understood. Long-termism is 
an open-ended construct by its very nature; it requires further interpretation if it is to be 
meaningful. Therefore, this article centres upon an examination of the secondary legal 
                                                          
1  Dr Katarzyna Chalaczkiewicz-Ladna, PhD (Edinburgh University) is currently working as a Research 
Associate and Graduate Teaching Assistant at the University of Glasgow and Tutor at the University of 
Edinburgh. Email: kchalac2@exseed.ed.ac.uk. I am extremely grateful to Mr David Cabrelli and Prof Laura 
Macgregor for their generous comments on the earlier drafts. All errors are mine own. Comments are welcome. 
2 Kevin Laverty, Managerial Myopia or Systemic Short-termism? The Importance of Managerial Systems in 
Valuing the Long Term 42 Management Decision 949, 949 (2004). 
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sources, i.e. the academic literature, and whether it can cast any light on the parameters of the 
notion of long-termism in its current incarnation.  
 The aim of this paper is to build up a normative theory and to conduct a normative 
gap-filling exercise, in order to develop the taxonomy of managerial long-termism in the UK, 
Germany and Delaware. This objective will be pursued by adopting hypothetical 
decisions/case studies, which will be used to determine what long-termism means. Such case 
studies furnish practical examples of long- and short-termism in the jurisdictions under 
review while allowing the interrelationships between corporate governance mechanisms to be 
stressed and identified. Two instruments have been chosen from which these case studies are 
then derived: 
 
(1) the shareholder v. stakeholder debate, which centres upon an examination of the 
question of to whom directors owe their duties, i.e. only to the shareholders in terms 
of the former theory, or to the non-member stakeholders as well, according to the 
stakeholder value theory; and  
(2) the predominant share ownership structure of public corporations in the 
jurisdictions under review. Publicly traded corporations have either a concentrated or 
a dispersed ownership structure and therefore these differences will affect how the 
board acts, the structure and orientation of its company law, and to whom it is 
accountable.  
 
Other factors also serve to influence the concept of long-termism and can be identified. 
However, the idea is to limit the drawing out of the case studies to the two variables listed 
above at (1) and (2), which function as auxiliary aids to assist in identifying examples of 
long-term decision-making in these three jurisdictions. These tools can be used as proxies 
that emphasise the structural differences in the corporate governance systems in the UK, 
Delaware and Germany. Firstly, ascertaining the objectives of the corporation (1) and 
determining whose interests are paramount is fundamental, as this inevitably influences our 
understanding of long-term decision-making. The time horizon of decision-making can be 
established only subsequently, when it is clear whose interests should prevail through the 
medium of corporate action. Secondly, different ownership structures (2) have a bearing on 
the company’s goals, the constitutional division of power within the company and the nature, 
content and orientation of their corporate laws, since they affect the pressures brought to bear 
3 
 
on the decision-making processes of the directors or managers in such corporations. This, in 
turn, enables contrasting examples of long-termism or short-termism to be identified within 
that contextual framework.  
The approach adopted in this article is not without its limitations. Due to differences 
between the jurisdictions in corporate objective and share ownership structure of the 
corporations, not all of the presented examples will hold in every jurisdiction. As such, the 
kinds of country-specific decisions, which are held to amount to examples of long-term 
conduct, may vary as a result of the diverse corporate governance systems, legal families and 
commercial cultures present in each of the jurisdictions under review. This will be addressed 
and pointed out throughout the course of the discussion. What is more, the main drawback 
associated with the case studies is the inherent subjectivity of the notion of long-termism: it is 
almost impossible to arrive at final conclusions regarding the content of this notion. The main 
objective of this paper is to overcome this obstacle and present a well-developed conception 
of long-term decision-making.  
The argument unfolds as follows. To start with, section 2 explains methodology 
applied and the choice of jurisdictions. Section 3 summarises the extent to which currently 
the law in the UK, Delaware and Germany imposes duties on the directors of solvent public 
companies to consider the long-term consequences of their decisions. Section 4 focuses on 
how the shareholder primacy and the stakeholder theories help us to map the nature and 
scope of the long-term norm through the identification of case studies. Each case study starts 
with a brief introduction on the origins and relevance of a particular scenario. Solutions 
within particular jurisdictions are then presented and it is stated whether a particular decision 
is an example of long- or short-termism. These are followed by comparative conclusions for 
each case study. Section 5 presents further cases studies and discusses the impact of share 
ownership structures within the parameters of long-termism. The structure of the gap-filling 
exercise is similar to that adopted in section 4 above. Finally, comparative conclusions 
regarding both instruments, i.e. the shareholder v. stakeholder debate and share ownership 
structure will be provided in section 6. 
2. Methodology and Jurisdictions under Review   
2.1 Methodology  
This paper is comparative in character. Comparison is an ideal tool, not only for getting a 
deeper knowledge of the law of a particular or various jurisdictions, but the juxtaposition of 
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different solutions allows us to put them into a broader perspective and context, which in turn 
results in a more thorough and comprehensive understanding of the law in general. In spite of 
the undeniable merits of comparative law, problems emerge when choosing an appropriate 
method for comparison. Currently, the approaches include ‘traditional approach,’3 ‘functional 
method,’4 or ‘common core studies.’5  
Taking into account the different approaches to comparative methodology and the 
subject of this research, the functional method has been chosen, as it emphasises that 
institutions that actually have a similar function must be compared and not the ones that seem 
similar on the surface.6 However, the functional method has a disadvantage for this research 
in that it arguably concentrates too much attention on the similarities between legal systems.7 
Hence, the functional method is not useful if it is the only approach employed. This research 
focuses on evaluating the concept of long-termism considering both similarities and 
differences, rather than concentrating only on emphasising similarities. This is necessary and 
is the most reasonable approach, which allows identifying the examples of divergence or 
convergence between the legal systems. This research might conclude that the three 
jurisdictions apply similar solutions; however, the presumption of similarity is not the aim of 
this study. Importantly, few scholars promote the study of both similarities and differences;8 
but currently it is far from clear whether the construction of similarities and differences is the 
method itself or a modified version of the functional method. To conclude, the proper balance 
between a functional method and looking for similarities and differences 9 is considered the 
best approach for this study and the techniques employed will adequately and effectively 
fulfil the aims of this paper.  
                                                          
3 Known also as a ‘black letter’ comparison, it engages in comparative law through the ‘law as a rule’ approach. 
Esin Örücü, Developing Comparative Law in Esin Örücü, David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook, 
49 (Oxford: Hart, 2007). 
4 Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kӧtz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 32ff (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
5 It aims at describing commonalities among legal systems hidden below apparent differences. Ugo Mattei et al., 
Schlesinger’s Comparative Law: Cases, Text, Materials, 98 (New York: Foundation Press: Thomson Reuters, 
2009). 
6 Zweigert and Kӧtz, supra n 4, 50.   
7 ibid 34, 40.   
8  See for example: Gerhard Dannemann, Similarities or Differences? in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 384 ff (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
9  The approach applied in this research resembles the one formulated by Reitz. John Reitz, How to do 
Comparative Law 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 617, 620 (1998). 
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2.2 Jurisdictions under Review 
UK, German and Delaware law are compared in this research since ‘long-termism’ is a 
dynamic concept in each of them in different ways and at different levels. The topic is 
particularly well-discussed in the Anglo-American literature. The UK has been chosen 
because the Companies Act 200610 introduced a duty enjoining directors to promote the 
success of the company.11 Delaware law was selected as a proxy for US law since it is a 
leading common law jurisdiction in the US – 66% of all Fortune 500 companies and more 
than 50% of companies whose securities trade on the main exchanges, e.g. the NYSE or 
NASDAQ 12  are incorporated in Delaware. Furthermore, Germany was chosen, as it is 
believed to have an ‘in-built tendency to long-termism’13 due to stakeholder value approach. 
The three jurisdictions have been chosen not only because they are influential, but 
also because they are very attractive from a comparative perspective. There are some 
substantial dissimilarities between UK and Delaware law, on the one hand, and German law, 
on the other – which have the potential to affect the parameters of long-termism. UK and 
Delaware law belong to the common law tradition with a well-developed body of case law, 
whilst Germany inherited the civil law tradition – the legal culture of which is to rely on 
code-based regulation. This study not only points out the similarities and differences between 
the UK and Delaware on the one hand and Germany on the other, it also compares both 
common law jurisdictions regarding the parameters of long-termism and identifies different 
attitudes towards this concept in the UK and Delaware.  
Overall, the study of these systems will allow not only a better understanding of the 
notion of long-termism during the decision-making processes in these jurisdictions, but will 
also cast some light on the management of the companies in general and identify any patterns 
in that respect. Broader, general debates in comparative company law (i.e. the discussion on 
the differences regarding the share ownership structure and corporate objective) will be 
scrutinised within the context of the UK, Delaware and German law. 
                                                          
10 Companies Act 2006 c 46 (henceforth: ‘CA 2006’). 
11 s 172 CA 2006. 
12 DLA Piper, Delaware Corporate Law and Litigation: What Happened in 2014 and What it Means for You in 
2015, 3 (12 January 2015) 
<www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Insights/Publications/2015/01/FINAL20142015AnnualDelawareCorporateLi
tigationReview.pdf>  accessed 12 December 2016. 
13 John Plender, Giving People a Stake in the Future 31 Long Range Planning 211 (1998). 
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3. Long-termism in Directors’ Duties – Primary Legislation and Soft Law   
3.1. Introduction 
This section discusses briefly the function of long-termism within the current legal 
frameworks of the UK, Delaware and Germany. The position in the UK, Delaware and 
Germany will be presented in turn.  
3.2. The UK 
The debate on long-term decision-making in the UK concentrates on s. 172 CA 2006 – the 
duty to promote the success of the company. Based on this provision the paramount task of 
the directors of solvent companies is to ‘promote the success of the company for the benefit 
of its members as a whole’ and only subsequently they are entitled to take into account any 
other factors – ‘likely consequences of any decision in the long term’ among them.14 The 
long-term perspective is not associated directly with the success of the company and has only 
a secondary importance. Not only the relevance of long-termism is debatable, but also the 
meaning of this concept is unclear. The legislator has left to the directors the subjective 
decision on what long-termism means in specific situations.15 Furthermore, the fundamental 
problem with the practical effectiveness of s. 172 CA 2006 would seem to be that its terms 
are not enforceable by non-shareholding stakeholders. 16  Moreover, long-termism is 
underlined (but not explained) on several occasions in the UK Corporate Governance Code, 17 
in the context of a general discussion of the purpose of corporate governance,18 the central 
role of the board19  and the importance of regulating executive directors’ remuneration.20 To 
                                                          
14 s 172 (1) (a) CA 2006. Section 172(1) is known as ‘enlightened shareholder value’ (ESV) – CA 2006, c 46, 
Explanatory Notes, Commentary on s 172 subs 325 
<www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/notes/division/6/2> accessed 12 December 2016.  
15 It is worth underlining that currently the Government is trying to improve the UK’s corporate governance 
framework. Among other things, there is an intention to introduce secondary legislation (which is expected to be 
in force by June 2018) to require all companies of significant size (private as well as public) to explain how their 
directors comply with the requirements of s 172 CA 2006. However, there is no discussion about the meaning of 
long-termism under s 172. See: BEIS, Corporate Governance Reform: The Government Response to the Green 
Paper Consultation, 4 and 6 (August 2017)  
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640470/corporate-governance-reform-
government-response.pdf> accessed 15 November 2017. 
16 Andrew Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Enlightened Shareholder Value, Constituency Statutes and 
More: Much Ado About Little? 22 (1) European Business Law Review 1, 33-36 (2011). 
17 Henceforth: ‘UK Code,’ April 2016, Financial Reporting Council (‘FRC’). 
18 UK Code 1.  
19 A.1 Main Principle ibid. 
20 D.1 Main Principle ibid. 
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sum up, the lack of any precise definition, or at least some guidance as to what is meant by it, 
makes the parameters of long-termism in the UK difficult to grasp. 
3.3. Delaware 
There is no statutory provision similar to section 172(1) CA 2006 that would directly relate to 
the relevance of ‘the likely consequences of any decision in the long term’ in Delaware law. 
Nor does the Delaware General Corporation Law 21  offer any guidance of what factors 
directors should consider in their decision-making processes. At the same time the soft law 
instruments in the US clearly encourage long-term shareholder value as a key corporate 
objective; however, without explaining the content and scope of this notion. To start with, the 
‘American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance’ promotes long-run profitability 
and long-term shareholder value. 22  Secondly, the ‘Key Agreed Principles to Strengthen 
Corporate Governance for U.S. Publicly Traded Companies’ pursue long-term shareholder 
value creation. 23 Finally, the recent ‘Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles’  –  
principles set up by a group of executives  of leading prominent public corporations – aim at 
long-term orientated governance.24 
 In this context, it is surprising to note that the discussion in the American law and 
economics literature on the relevance of long-term considerations and especially on the 
significance of long-term orientated shareholder value is thriving. To illustrate that point, 
Mitchell stresses that the maximisation of the short-term stock price and the avoidance of 
long-term accountability is a characteristic of the American corporation. 25  Furthermore, 
according to Hansmann and Kraakman, it is obvious that an increase in long-term shareholder 
value is an indisputably valid corporate objective.26 To sum up, the rich discussion on long-
termism that has taken place indicates that it is (or ought to be) an important feature of 
                                                          
21 Henceforth: ‘DGCL.’ 
22 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 57 (St. Paul, 
Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1994). 
23 National Association of Corporate Directors, Key Agreed Principles to Strengthen Corporate Governance for 
U.S. Publicly Traded Companies, 4 (2011) 
<www.nacdonline.org/files/PDF/KEY%20AGREED%20PRINCIPLES%202011.pdf> accessed 12 December 
2016. 
24 Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles <www.governanceprinciples.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/GovernancePrinciples_Principles.pdf> accessed 12 December 2016. 
25 Lawrence Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export, 52 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 2001). 




Delaware law. However, the criticism that is levelled in this article is that the current 
discussion seems to be mainly theoretical. 
3.4. Germany 
The academic literature on German law suggests that long-termism is embedded within the 
German system of corporate governance, 27 despite the lack of provisions similar to s. 172 CA 
2006. The debate in Germany is generally focused on new provisions on remuneration of 
members of the management board in a listed company.28 According to the AktG ‘[t]he 
remuneration system of listed companies shall be aimed at the company’s sustainable 
development (nachhaltige Unternehmensentwicklung).’29 The subsequent provision adds that 
‘[t]he calculation basis of variable remuneration components in the listed company should 
therefore be several years long (...).’30 These two provisions, the guidelines on determining 
the levels of remuneration, are critical for encouraging forward thinking during decision-
making processes in public German companies. Neither the legislation nor the Explanatory 
Notes to the Act31 elaborate on the terms ‘sustainable development’32  or ‘several years.’ 
Hence, it must be decided on a case-by-case basis how to understand the sustainable 
development of the company and without doubt, there is an element of discretion in this 
respect.  
 Also, the need for the corporation’s sustainable development (expressed as 
‘sustainable creation of value’ and ‘sustainable growth’) is clearly visible in the German 
Corporate Governance Code, but only in a general manner, without any guidance on the 
meaning of this notion. 33   Moreover, the notion of future-orientated and longer-lasting 
management is extensively underlined in the German literature and is clearly more evident 
                                                          
27 Marcus Roth, Corporate Boards in Germany in Paul Davies et al. (eds.), Corporate Boards in Law and 
Practice: A Comparative Analysis in Europe, 361 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
28 §87(1) Aktiengesetz, as of 6 September 1965 (BGBl I, 1089) (henceforth: ‘AktG’). Translation as at 1 
December 2011, by Norton Rose 
<nortonrose.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-2010-english-translation-pdf-59656.pdf> accessed 12 
December 2016.  
29§87(1)2 AktG. The term ‘nachhaltige Unternehmensentwicklung’ can also be translated as ‘lasting increase in 
value of the company.’ 
30 §87(1)3 AktG. 
31  Explanatory Notes, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtsausschusses (17 June 2009) BT-Drucks 
16/13433 <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/134/1613433.pdf> accessed 12 December 2016. 
32 In this paper, ‘sustainability’ is perceived as advocating responsible balance between the environmental, 
social and economic goals in the companies. See: Benjamin Richardson and Beate Sjafjell, Capitalism, the 
Sustainability Crisis and the Limitations of Current Business Governance in Beate Sjafjell and Benjamin 
Richardson, Company Law and Sustainability –  Legal Barriers and Opportunities, 20 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
33 §4.1.1, §4.2.3 and §5.4.6 German Corporate Governance Code, as amended on 7 February 2017 (Deutscher 
Corporate Governance Kodex) (henceforth: ‘Kodex’). 
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than in the UK or Delaware.34 However, even if it is at the heart of decision-making in 
Germany, the content and scope of long-termism remains unclear. 
3.5. Interim Conclusion 
In sum, the purpose of long-termism in the jurisdictions under review is to encourage forward 
thinking by directors, which in turn contributes towards more responsible decision-making. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of long-termism in practice remains questionable owing to the 
lack of content and scope afforded by the concept. Therefore, to identify and sketch out the 
parameters of long-termism in the UK, Delaware and Germany, practical examples of long- 
and short-termism will be presented by reference to both the primary and secondary sources.  
4. Gap-filling Exercise in the Context of Shareholder v. Stakeholder Theories 
4.1. Shareholder Primacy and Stakeholder Theory – Introduction  
Two concepts of the corporation currently predominate. The first treats the corporation as an 
economic entity whose purpose is to maximise shareholder value and the second perceives it 
as a social institution having the aim of furthering the interests of the corporation itself within 
the wider society in which it operates. These are referred to as the shareholder and the 
stakeholder value approaches, respectively. The former is traditionally identified with Anglo-
American jurisdictions and these countries are often caricatured as shareholder primacy 
systems. On the other hand, one of the most notable representatives of the stakeholder value 
approach is Germany. 
In this paper, it is argued that the content of long-termism is inevitably linked to the 
chosen corporate objective, i.e. to the notion of whose interests should prevail in a company. 
Diverse corporate objectives mean that the company’s long- and short-term interests are 
perceived differently. In a shareholder-orientated jurisdiction, long-termism will be identified 
with long-term shareholder value, whilst in a stakeholder jurisdiction; it will be identified 
with the interests of various stakeholder groups. These concepts differ fundamentally: long-
term orientated shareholder value will not always be beneficial for the corporation at large 
and long-term orientated stakeholder value might aim to achieve different objectives. 
Traditionally, the stakeholder value theory has been seen as more long-term focused and the 
shareholder approach has been accused of having an intrinsic short-term bias. This fosters a 
                                                          
34 See e.g.: Uwe Hüffer and Jens Koch, Aktiengesetz, §87 (München: C.H. Beck, 2016); Gerald Spindler, in 




debate about whether the stakeholder-orientated countries are the ultimate exemplars of long-
termism or whether perhaps shareholder-focused jurisdictions simply regard long-termism 
differently. Whether these distinct corporate objectives influence the parameters of long-
termism will be reviewed, as will the common perceptions about the jurisdictions under 
review, e.g. Germany is generally perceived as more stakeholder-orientated and therefore 
more long-term focused, whilst the UK and Delaware are treated as rather more shareholder 
and short-term concentrated.  
This section will first introduce the general background on shareholder v. stakeholder 
theories in the countries under review. Five case studies taken from the academic literature 
will then be presented to elaborate further upon the impact of corporate objectives on the 
content of long-termism during decision-making processes. These case studies focus on share 
price, decision to reduce carbon emissions from a company’s plant, excessive marketing, lack 
of focus on environmental and health and safety issues and promotion of cultural, social and 
civic aims. The case studies present practical examples of what is, and what is not, long-term 
decision-making with a justification. Each case study has relevance to the shareholder v. 
stakeholder debate. An explanation is offered of why a particular decision is an example of 
long- or short-termism in each jurisdiction, whether it is likely to constitute a lawful activity 
there, and how likely it is that it will be taken. For short-term decisions and potential breaches 
of directors’ duties, s. 172 CA 2006 and the relevant sections in the other jurisdictions will be 
considered.35 Concluding remarks are offered at the end of each case study. 
4.1.1. The Shareholder Primacy Theory 
Assessment of the concept 
One of the main justifications for the shareholder value approach is the theory that 
‘[m]aximising value for shareholders is the right social goal for corporations, because it is 
equivalent to maximising the overall wealth created by the corporation.’36 Friedman claims 
that the company’s directors are merely the shareholders’ agents, so their sole purpose should 
be to maximise the shareholders’ wealth.37 The shareholder value approach is often identified 
as one of the obstacles to a long-term approach, as it is accused of promoting short-termism 
                                                          
35 The breach of different directors’ duties is not precluded. 
36 Margaret Blair, In the Best Interest of the Corporation: Directors’ Duties in the Wake of the Global Financial 
Crisis in: Thomas Clarke, Douglas Branson (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance, 63ff (Los 
Angeles, California: SAGE Publications, 2012).  
37 Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits (New 
York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970). 
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and fixation on profits for shareholders.38  However, there are also voices that long-term 
shareholder value can be distinguished and that it provokes positive connotations.39 Finally, 
Rappaport suggests that it is not the concept of shareholder value itself that is problematic, 
but its misapplication.40  
Position in the US and UK 
The dominant theory in Anglo-American jurisdictions has been, certainly since the 1970s, the 
shareholder primacy theory.41 That should not be taken to mean that the UK and US legal 
position are equivalent. The shareholder value theory is predominantly perceived as a proper 
decision-making norm in the US and Delaware in general.42 The Supreme Court of Michigan 
in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company underlined the shareholder wealth maximization principle 
in 1919.43   
The approach in the US can be contrasted with the position in the UK. As it was 
underlined in the section 3.2 above, in the UK s. 172 CA 2006 adopts the enlightened 
shareholder value (ESV) model. In the first instance, directors should focus on promoting the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members and only subsequently are they entitled 
to take into account any other factors – long-term interests among them.44 There are also 
voices that this model forges a ‘“third way” that merges elements of the shareholder and the 
stakeholder approaches.’45 However, this description of ESV is rejected in this paper and it is 
argued that the approach adopted in s. 172 CA 2006 is simply another incarnation of the 
shareholder primacy theory. This position is rooted in the fact that the interests of the 
shareholders are paramount and the consideration of non-shareholders’ interests is 
subordinated to the interests of shareholders.  
                                                          
38 Andrew Keay, Getting to Grips with the Shareholder Value Theory in Corporate Law 39 Common Law 
World Review 358, 376 (2010). 
39  Michael Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function 22(1) 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 32, 32 (2010).  
40 Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession 61(3) Financial Analysts Journal 65, 
72 (2005). 
41 Keay, supra n 16, 1-2. 
42 Leo Strine Jr, Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-profit Corporations Seek Profit 47 Wake Forest 
Law Review 135, 147 fn 34 (2012). 
43 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 170 NW 668 (Mich 1919). 
44 s 172 (1) (a) CA 2006. 
45 Cynthia Williams and John Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American 
Shareholder Value Construct 38 Cornell International Law Journal 493, 496 (2005).  
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4.1.2. The Stakeholder Theory 
Evaluation of the theory 
Stakeholder theory dictates that the interests of all of the various stakeholders in a firm, 
including the shareholders, should be taken into account during the decision-making 
process.46 Freeman famously stated that a stakeholder should be understood as ‘any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s purpose.47 
The theory that stakeholder value approach is long-term focused does not go unchallenged. 
Clearly, non-shareholders among stakeholders do not always appear to be focused on the 
long-term. They are linked with the company via contracts and arguably, they are risk-averse, 
which may cost the company in terms of its ability to attract new investment and stay 
competitive in the modern business world.48 Overall, the main criticism of the stakeholder 
theory is that it is not possible to define whose interests should actually be taken into 
consideration. It is feared that directors use the stakeholder theory as an excuse for bad 
management. To illustrate that point, Easterbrook and Fischel famously stated that ‘a 
manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for the community) 
has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.’49  
The stakeholder theory in Germany 
The German corporate governance system is traditionally recognised as being stakeholder 
oriented. Nevertheless, there is no agreement among German commentators as to whether the 
stakeholder value approach is indeed the current corporate objective in Germany.50 Despite 
mandatory co-determination rules, the AktG no longer explicitly refers to non-shareholder 
interests, as had been the case under the now repealed §70 (1) 1937 Aktiengesetz. In 
Germany, the duties are owed to the company and members of both management and 
supervisory boards are obliged to serve ‘the interests of the enterprise’ 
                                                          
46 Jensen, supra n 39, 32. 
47 R Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, 53 (Boston: Pitman, 1984). 
48 Shuangge Wen, Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Governance: Legal Aspects, Practices and Future 
Direction, 222 (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013). 
49 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 38 (Cambridge, Mass.; 
London: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
50 Klaus Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation in: 
Fleckner et al. (eds), Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and International Analysis, 41 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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(Unternehmensinteresse).51 This notion is not clear, and hence debate surrounds the corporate 
objective.  
However, there are convincing arguments that the German legal system leans heavily 
towards the stakeholder theory. Firstly, §4.1.1 of the Kodex explicitly states that the 
management board is obliged to act in the interest of the whole enterprise and to take into 
account the interests of shareholders, employees and other stakeholders with the objective of 
achieving sustainable creation of value. Secondly, the interpretation of the expression 
‘interests of the enterprise’ suggests that stakeholder theory is expressive of the overarching 
corporate objective. In the first few years after the Aktiengesetz was implemented in 1965, the 
broad concept of ‘the enterprise per se’ dominated – i.e. the interests of all stakeholders 
should be taken into account.52 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the debate concentrated on 
the Co-determination Act from 1976 and its influences on the AktG.53 Today the stakeholder-
orientated approach produces mixed views. Nevertheless, the predominant view seems to be 
that the management exercises broad decision-making powers and the interests of 
shareholders (assets), employees (labour), and the general public (public welfare) should be 
respected.54  
4.1.3. Conclusions 
Taking into account the discussion immediately above, it appears that in practice 
Germany differs from the two other jurisdictions, because the management board here is 
more incentivised to consider other factors and interests. They are encouraged to look at the 
enterprise in a more holistic way. Overall, despite some voices to the contrary, there is a 
tendency in the academic literature to assume that Germany, as leaning towards the 
stakeholder value approach, is more long-term focused in comparison to the UK and 
Delaware. Hence, the gap-filling exercise conducted in this paper will assist in determining 
the extent to which Germany actually prioritises long-term decision-making.  
 
                                                          
51 This concept was developed by the courts. See: BGH 25.02. 1982 – II ZR 174/80 – BGHZ 83, 122, 134; 
BGH, 12.03. 1990 – II ZR 179/89 – BGHZ 110, 323, 334.  
52 Holger Fleischer, in: Gerald Spindler, Eberhard Stilz (eds.), Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2015) §76 mn. 25 (author’s translation). 
53 ibid §76 mn. 26.  
54 Hüffer and Koch, supra n 34, §76 mn. 28.  
14 
 
4.2. Examples of Long- and Short-Term Decision-Making: A Series of Case Studies 
4.2.1 Case Study 1: A Focus on Share Price 
4.2.1.1 Introduction 
An emphasis on the share price is commonly identified as a leading example of short-termism 
in the academic literature.55 This case study draws on this academic literature. This case study 
is linked both to the shareholder v. stakeholder debate and to the ownership structure of the 
company. However, it is more appropriate to present it in the context of the discussion of 
corporate objectives since a decision to focus on the share price vividly illustrates the 
concerns related to the issue of whose interests should prevail in the company. 
In shareholder primacy jurisdictions, it is generally expected that directors will 
concentrate on share price maximisation, whereas in stakeholder-orientated jurisdictions, this 
inclination is presumed to be weaker, as in the latter directors cannot focus exclusively on the 
interests of the shareholders. Therefore, concentration on the share price should be 
theoretically more widespread in the UK and Delaware than in Germany as it is less likely 
that it constitutes a breach of a director’s duty in the former. Does this mean that a focus on 
share price constitutes an example of long-term thinking in the Anglo-American jurisdictions? 
With each of those questions in mind, the discussion turns first to consideration of the 
position in Delaware law. 
4.2.1.2 Delaware  
Concentration on the share price in Delaware reflects the widespread shareholder value 
principle. Hence, such decision would most likely be supported by shareholders in Delaware 
– from their perspective it can be a justified and profitable decision. There is only one 
problem; over-emphasis on share price is the embodiment of short-term behaviour. Does 
focussing on the short-term impede decision-making in Delaware? Strine’s findings support 
the claim that the law in Delaware does not oblige directors to maximise short-term profits 
for shareholders, but rather by virtue of a duty of loyalty it does require them ‘to pursue a 
good faith strategy to maximise profits for the shareholders.’56 Consequently, directors are 
                                                          
55 See e.g. Luca Cerioni, The Success of the Company in s. 172(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006: Towards an 
‘Enlightened Directors’ Primacy? 4 Original Law Review 1, 3 (2008); BIS, Summary of Responses: A Long-
Term Focus for Corporate Britain, para. 14 (March 2011) 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207536/11-797-summary-responses-
long-term-focus-corporate-britain.pdf>  accessed 12 December 2016.  
56 Strine supra n 42, 155. 
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not obliged to maximise short-term profits, but at the same time they are not forbidden to do 
so. Thus, arguably a short-term decision to focus on share price appears to be consistent with 
the corporate objectives under the company law of Delaware.  
Since board members exercise broad decision-making powers in Delaware, is it 
accurate to say that they are somehow incentivised by other non-legal factors – such as the 
market – to maximise the corporation’s share price? On the one hand, they cannot be forced 
to do so, especially as shareholders are weak in Delaware57 and cannot really threaten the 
board, if their objectives differ (long-term oriented shareholders and short-term orientated 
directors and vice versa), unless they are able to gather the majority of the shares and remove 
the board or director.58 On the other hand, directors will be personally interested in keeping 
the share price high. Hu argues aptly that because a poor share price may cause them to be 
replaced (or not re-elected), board members have an incentive to keep the stock price high, 
sometimes without analysing whether this will actually promote the success of the 
company. 59  Thus, not only pressures from shareholders (whether they are effective is a 
different question) combined with their often short-term involvement in the company, but 
also market drivers exert pressure on directors to achieve quick results.  
At the same time, it is worth stressing that the shareholder primacy orientation in 
Delaware, with its over-emphasis on short-term profits, such as a focus on share price, is 
widely criticised in the literature. In this context, it is noted that short-termism can be 
identified with the managerial obsession with current profitability.60 Lydenberg emphasises 
that an excessive focus on short-term profits has various detrimental effects including the 
misallocation of assets, the dangerous volatility of financial markets and the diversion of 
productive resources to repairing environmental and social damage. 61  Without a doubt, 
considering factors other than shareholders’ immediate profits and an occasional willingness 
to sacrifice them is an indication of long-term thinking.  
To sum up, Delaware law supplies a strong incentive for directors to take decisions 
that concentrate solely on the growth of the share price, while considering the diffusion of 
shareholder value. The recent criticism in the US of this policy does not seem to have 
                                                          
57 See section 5.1.2 below. 
58 §141 (k) DGCL. 
59 Henry Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment 38 UCLA Law Review 277, 332-
333 (1990).  
60 Lawrence Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance 45 Vanderbilt Law Review 1263, 1283 (1992). 
61 Stephen Lydenberg, Long-term Investing: A Proposal for how to Define and Implement Long-term Investing,  
47 (2007) Summit on the Future of the Corporation Paper Series on Corporate Design 
<www.corporation2020.org/pdfs/SummitPaperSeries.pdf>  accessed 12 December 2016. 
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changed this. A decision to focus on share price does not appear to constitute an unlawful 
activity in itself but it can contribute to a possible breach of directors’ duties if it is 
detrimental to the company. The business judgment rule will protect directors if their 
decisions are not particularly successful since the courts in Delaware are not going to second-
guess the decisions of a well-motivated, non-biased fiduciary, if he is acting in good faith. 62 
4.2.1.3 Germany 
A focus solely on share price is most likely to constitute an example of short-term thinking 
under German law. Management boards have wide decision-making powers according to §76 
(1) AktG. It seems that the board can decide to focus only on share price, especially when it 
is under the strong influence of the majority shareholder;63 although, in general, the board is 
not bound by any instructions from shareholders. However, the majority shareholder is less 
likely to put short-term pressure on the board – the evidence suggests that shareholders in the 
blockholding jurisdictions tend to have longer time-horizons.64 Further, in the prevailing view, 
shared also by the author of this paper, plural goals must be decisive for the management 
board during decision-making. Hence, clearly exercising discretion means properly 
evaluating the coincidence of the interests of the company and its enterprise.  
Moreover, in Germany management board’s discretionary powers are limited by the 
duty to ensure the lasting profitability and continued existence of the corporation. 65 
Therefore, the reasonable realisation of profits rather than profit maximisation is a principal 
aim of the management board. The board is strongly encouraged to have regard to the longer 
lasting development of the company and therefore, the focus on the share price is not a top 
priority. In other words, German law provides weaker incentives for decisions to focus on the 
share price. It is the view of this author, thinking only of the share price will usually preclude 
the lasting profitability of the corporation. This is the case, because concentrating on share 
price might result in a loosening of focus on the corporation in general, cutting production 
costs or employee benefits.  
Concentrating only on the share price is also not consistent with the corporate 
objective in Germany as it favours the interests of only one group, i.e. the shareholders. Since 
                                                          
62 Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) 872 (Justice Horsey). 
63 See section 5.1.2 below. 
64 ibid.   
65 See: Spindler, supra n 34, §76 mn. 94. However, it is worth underlining that the AktG requires only that the 
management board ensures the continued existence of the corporation (§91(2) AktG) and prepares the report on 
the profitability of the company (§90(1) 2 AktG). ‘Lasting profitability’ is not explicitly mentioned in the 
legislation, but underlined only by the commentators. 
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there is no ranking of interests, the corporate objective is not solely identified with 
shareholders’ interests. Further support for this claim is supplied by Baums who explicitly 
emphasises that under German law: ‘[t]here is no duty to maximise the value of the shares’ 
and that the interests of various stakeholders must be taken into account.66  Consequently, 
concentrating on the share price alone is more likely to constitute an example of short-
termism under German law, which is more evident than under Delaware and UK law. In 
jurisdictions leaning towards the stakeholder value approach, there is a greater likelihood that 
a focus on the company’s share price constitutes a breach of directors’ duties than in a 
shareholder-orientated country.  This does not prevent directors from taking such a decision, 
as it is not illegal in itself. If taken, such a business decision is protected under the business 
judgment rule in  Germany, but only if the management board can establish that the decision 
was based on appropriate information and that they were acting in the best interests of the 
company.67 
4.2.1.4 The UK 
The concentration by the board of directors in the UK only on share price during the 
decision-making processes is an example of short-termism. As explained earlier, it is striking 
how focused the ESV principle is on the shareholder value model. A long-term approach, 
although encouraged by the CA 2006 and promoted in the literature, is not enforceable. Thus, 
it is argued that these decisions will be popular with the shareholders if they are profitable for 
them. If these conditions are met, it is likely that short-term decisions will be taken, as UK 
law affords strong incentives for such a decision. The answer is not that clear however, if 
there are conflicts of interests between the board and shareholders. In the end, directors are 
responsible for the running of the company and they will take the decision to concentrate on 
share price or not and it will depend on their management style, goals and the position of 
shareholders within the company. The other question is whether concentrating on the share 
price is really beneficial for shareholders, if it considers only immediate profits and does not 
pay enough attention to long-term effects. Without a doubt, it might be profitable for 
shareholders in the short run; however, concentrating solely on the share price constitutes an 
                                                          
66 Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in Germany – System and Current Developments, 5 (Arbeitspapiere 
Goethe Universität, 1998).  
<www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/43029805/paper70.pdf>  accessed 12 December 2016. 
67 See: §93(1)2 AktG and §3.8 Kodex. 
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example of short-term thinking in the UK and such decisions are detrimental for shareholders 
in the longer perspective.  
Similar to the position in Delaware, this example of short-termism in the UK is not as 
strong as it is under German law, because arguably the decision to focus on share price is 
more consistent with the corporate objective in the Anglo-American jurisdictions. This does 
not constitute an obvious breach of directors’ duties in the UK, but it definitely contributes to 
one, if the decision does not promote the success of the company. UK law does not 
incorporate the business judgment rule; however, only instances of serious mismanagement 
can be actionable.68 Hence, the mere fact that a particular decision is unsuccessful is not 
enough to render a director liable in law.  
The decision to focus solely on share price has been criticised in the UK literature. In 
a consultation on ‘A Long-Term Focus for Corporate Britain,’ some respondents 
acknowledged problems with the short-term measures of company performance such as 
earnings per share and total shareholder return.69 Further, clearly an increase in the share 
price cannot be the objective of the company in itself. The increase in share price ‘can only be 
significant, over time, as one of the signals of the company’s long-term increase in values.’70 
4.2.1.5 Conclusions 
A focus on the company’s share price is likely to be an example of lawful managerial conduct 
in all three jurisdictions. It can only contribute to a breach of directors’ duties if the given 
decision is not taken in the best interests of the company. This case study confirms that it 
cannot be argued that any given corporate objective obliges directors to focus on the share 
price. However, the shareholder value principle creates much greater scope and justification 
for directors to focus solely on the maximisation of the share price. Therefore, it is more 
likely that there is greater incentive for such decisions to be taken in Delaware and in the UK 
than in Germany.  
The discussion of this kind of case demonstrates that the sole focus on share price has 
been criticised in all three jurisdictions. The consensus view seems to be that such decisions 
constitute examples of short-term thinking. Although in general profit generation by 
companies is justified, it is strongly underlined in the literature that the companies should 
                                                          
68 CA 2006 Explanatory Notes,  supra n 14, Commentary on s 172, subs 328. 
69 BIS, Summary of Responses, supra n 55, para. 14. 
70 Cerioni, supra n 55, 3 [emphasis in original]. 
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achieve their purpose within the overarching purpose of sustainable development. 71  A 
decision to focus on share price constitutes a stronger example of short-termism in Germany 
since it is not consistent with the corporate objective there. Focus on the share price is also an 
example of short-termism in jurisdictions leaning towards the shareholder value theory – 
because, although it is beneficial for shareholders, such decision-making brings only 
immediate profits and its further impact on the company is difficult to estimate. Does it 
undermine the shareholder value principle in these jurisdictions? There is certainly no 
evidence for that. 
4.2.2 Case Study 2: A Decision to Reduce Carbon Emissions from a Company’s Plant   
4.2.2.1 Introduction 
This example is taken from an article by Blair in which she describes a state of affairs where 
a board has decided to act aggressively to reduce carbon emission from a company’s plant 
(without specifying what the type of company is).72 In order to make this case study more 
convincing, it is assumed here  that the hypothetical companies in Delaware, Germany and 
UK each have the same corporate purpose. That corporate purpose is of a company 
manufacturing cars where arguably, the carbon footprint is high73 and owing to that fact, the 
reduction of carbon emissions is a vital decision. 
Reducing carbon emissions suggests consideration of environmental and community 
interests.74 Such decision is not immediately linked to profit maximisation; it rather suggests 
some costs for the corporation and/or investment in new technologies. In general, this is an 
example of corporate social responsibility (CSR).75 However, if the action is justified and 
well planned it might be profitable for shareholders. Certainly, factors other than the 
shareholders’ interests were taken into account during this decision-making process and this 
                                                          
71 Beate Sjafjell and Jukka Mahonen, Upgrading the Nordic Corporate Governance Model for Sustainable 
Companies 11(2) European Company Law 58, 59 (2014). 
72 Blair, supra n 36, 71. 
73  See e.g.: Mike Berners-Lee et al., What's the Carbon Footprint of …a New Car? (The Guardian, 23 
September 2010) <www.theguardian.com/environment/green-living-blog/2010/sep/23/carbon-footprint-new-
car> accessed 12 December 2016. 
74 This case study does not scrutinise the environmental law regulations like for instance the Kyoto Protocol. For 
the discussion on carbon emission management see: Janek Ratnatunga, Kashi Balachandran, Carbon Emissions 
Management and the Financial Implications of Sustainability in Paulo Tatticchi et al. (eds.), Corporate 
Sustainability, 59ff (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2013). 
75 According to the European Commission, CSR requires companies ‘to integrate social, environmental, ethical, 
human rights and consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy.’ Communication from the 
Commission, A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility COM(2011) 681 final, s. 3.1 
(2011). See also: Marina Nehme and Claudia Wee, Tracing the Historical Development of Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Corporate Social Reporting 15 James Cook University Law Review 129 (2008). 
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is the main justification for introducing this case study. The ability to look beyond the 
shareholders’ interests is in line with the discussion of the shareholder v. stakeholder issue, 
i.e. this example epitomises the corporate objective debate particularly well. Would a 
decision to reduce carbon emissions be acceptable in all three jurisdictions? The topic of the 
reduction of carbon emissions in the context of the law of Delaware, Germany and the UK 
will now be addressed. 
4.2.2.2 Delaware 
As far as Delaware law is concerned, the decision described by Blair would likely be lawful, 
as the board exercises broad decision-making powers and it is entitled to reduce carbon 
emissions. This can only occur under the condition that this decision is also beneficial for 
shareholders. Hence, arguably this jurisdiction supplies weak incentives for this kind of 
decision. Overall, Delaware law is quite clear that additional interests can only be pursued 
when the shareholders’ interests are also met.  Strine, for example, finds a tendency to 
consider the interests of other stakeholders to be equal with the interests of shareholders ‘a 
tad naive and tiring.’76 The decision to reduce carbon emissions appears to be an example of 
long-term thinking, as it arguably goes beyond the immediate shareholders’ profits. The 
assumption is made that the decision has been diligently thought-out and the effects of this 
reduction duly considered.  
If it satisfies the interests of the shareholders and it was taken in the best interest of 
the company, the board’s decision to reduce carbon emissions is a lawful activity and should 
not contribute to a breach of the directors’ duties. The business judgment rule appears to 
protect well-motivated and rational decisions, even if they do not maximise shareholder value. 
Clearly, this approach allows directors in Delaware to consider aims beyond profit 
maximisation. Thus, the consideration of the interests of other stakeholders or long-term 
factors is permitted, providing the interests of shareholders are satisfied, but it cannot stand as 
a sole justification for a decision. The fact that the reduction of carbon emissions might be 
beneficial for both the environment and the public in general is a bonus. The reduction of 
carbon emissions might be beneficial for shareholders in terms of their leadership role in the 
environment protection, as Blair describes, but in the longer-term this also yields financial 
profits. The aim of long-term share value maximisation is self-evident and it seems to be 
encouraged in Delaware.  
                                                          





A decision to reduce carbon emissions is likely to be an example of long-termism under 
German law. Such decision is arguably not only taken to promote the immediate interests of 
shareholders but also considers the interests of other stakeholders. The reduction of the 
carbon emissions should generally positively influence the company in the long run and thus 
the decision to do so is socially responsible. Siemens, in its Sustainability Report of 2011, 
informs that the company reduced carbon dioxide emissions by 22% compared to 2006 when 
the established target was 20%. Sustainability was articulated as ‘our guiding principle 
[which] creates major business opportunities for our company.’ 77  Hence, this is not a 
hypothetical example but a real decision taken by a German company.  
As previously noted the discretionary powers of the management board are limited in 
Germany by the duty of ensuring lasting profitability and the continued existence of the 
corporation. Hüffer and Koch argue that the concept of lasting profitability corresponds 
primarily to the interests of the shareholders as investors and it also serves the interests of the 
employees and public welfare since the public interest cannot rely on economic entities that 
are unprofitable in the long-term. They also distinguish lasting profitability from short-term 
profit maximisation.78 This suggests that lasting profitability is not connected to short-term 
profits and hence directors are discouraged from concentrating on it. If it contributes to the 
lasting profitability of the company and goes beyond short-term profits, a decision to reduce 
carbon emissions is likely to be consistent with the country’s corporate objective and will 
likely be lawful. There is a greater incentive for such a decision to be taken and it is highly 
unlikely that it will constitute a breach of directors’ duties in Germany. Even if the decision is 
ultimately unsuccessful, the management board can hide behind the shield of the business 
judgment rule unless it can be proved that it did not act in the best interests of the company.  
Is the position under German law any different from that applicable in the UK and 
Delaware? The decision-making process in Germany appears to involve a greater degree of 
balancing of the interests of various stakeholders than is the case in the UK or Delaware. This 
decision appears to be more natural in Germany than in the other two jurisdictions. This case 
study demonstrates also that in a stakeholder jurisdiction, at least theoretically, the law 
                                                          
77  Siemens Sustainability Report 2011 (Press Release Munich, 21 May 2012) 
<www.siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/?press=/en/pressrelease/2012/corporate/axx20120525.htm> accessed 
12 December 2016. 
78 Hüffer and Koch, supra n 34, §76 mn. 34-35.  
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provides greater scope for different points of view to be considered, the situation is analysed 
from different perspectives and the decision is more comprehensive.  
4.2.2.4 The UK 
Under UK law, the given illustration should also provide an example of long-termism. The 
decision to reduce carbon emissions is most likely to be an investment that will contribute in 
the future development of the company as a whole and not only to an increase in the 
shareholder value. This decision might be favourable to the enterprise and the various 
stakeholders listed in s. 172 CA 2006 in the long-run. Before making a decision, the board 
must scrutinise whether it is beneficial to shareholders as a whole, as this is the paramount 
objective under the Companies Act 2006. Shareholders’ interests are a key concern for 
directors and directors are accountable only to them, but this decision has also some chance 
of being consistent with the ESV principle promoted in the Companies Act.  
It is argued in this paper that the decision to reduce carbon emissions most likely will 
constitute a lawful activity and if it is considered to increase shareholder value, the law 
affords incentives for such a decision to be taken. As such, it would be difficult to claim a 
breach of directors’ duties. Further, as far as UK law is concerned, the decision to act to 
reduce emissions will be encouraged in the literature, insofar as it goes ‘beyond routine day-
to-day operations’ – meaning that it is actually ‘a strategic decision’ which considers, ‘by 
using the available information, the consequences in the long-run of the intended course of 
action.’79 However, at the same time and similar to the position in Delaware, the UK law 
supplies quite weak incentives for such decision, in a sense that it depends only on whether it 
will be beneficial for shareholders, as the other factors are of lesser importance.  
4.2.2.5 Conclusions 
The conclusion regarding the nature of such a decision appears to be very similar under these 
three jurisdictions: it would be permissible in all of them and it seems to be a sustainable 
long-term investment for the company. The background and justification for the decision is 
slightly different in each jurisdiction though. In Delaware and UK law, the decision is taken 
primarily because it serves the interests of the shareholders. If it is also beneficial to other 
stakeholders, it is even better, but this is not an essential condition and rather an additional 
                                                          
79 Cerioni, supra n 55, 4 [emphasis in original]. 
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benefit. 80 Arguably, the decision-making process under German law requires the balancing 
of different interests. Hence, it is naturally a stronger example of long-termism under German 
law, as it is more in line with the corporate objective there.  
4.2.3 Case study 3: Excessive Marketing 
4.2.3.1 Introduction 
The next issue to be analysed is the time horizon of a decision to concentrate on excessive  
marketing. Excessive, 81 and therefore, detrimental marketing, could be the outcome where a 
professional hired by the company is incompetent. In this case, the main claim would be by 
the company against the third party in charge of the excessive marketing campaign. This case 
study, however, does not analyse this issue and instead concentrates on a board’s decision to 
over-promote the company. The following analysis is based on the assumption that the 
hypothetical companies in the UK, Delaware and Germany all have the same corporate 
purpose. They are deemed to be medium-sized, pharmaceutical companies. 
Companies all over the world invest in marketing. A decision to do so cannot be 
identified with specific corporate objectives and a question arises about how this decision fits 
in with the company’s corporate objective and whether it is more likely to be taken in one 
jurisdiction than another. Obviously, this decision affects shareholders. If the marketing is 
carried out successfully, they will be the first to see its effects. Marketing will also have an 
effect on other stakeholders. The excessive marketing scenario is inspired by the following 
case described in the Kay Review:  
 
In the 1970s, Glaxo made a successful long-term investment in the development 
and promotion of Zantac which created a British world leader in pharmaceuticals. 
In the 1990s, however, the company – in common with other global 
pharmaceutical companies – appears to have given relatively too much attention 
to marketing and to the acquisition of other pharmaceutical businesses, and not 
enough to the fundamental research on which long-term success in this industry 
                                                          
80 Millon evaluates the potential for CSR to stimulate environmental sustainability, as the law is currently 
inadequate for this task. It is stated that the ‘ethical’ CSR model is ineffective in the shareholder primacy 
jurisdictions. In contrast, the ‘strategic’ CSR – with investment in stakeholder well-being in order to promote 
the company’s long-run economic viability – seems to be more effective; however not without limitations. First, 
shareholders may still object such investment and secondly it will only be possible if the company generates 
profits. David Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Sustainability in Beate Sjafjell, 
Benjamin Richardson, Company Law and Sustainability – Legal Barriers and Opportunities, 35ff (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
81 Meaning ‘too much or too great’ – see: Oxford Dictionary for the Business World, 283 (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press,1993). 
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depends. The long-term damage resulting from such misdirection was 
exemplified in the $3bn fine imposed by the US regulatory authorities as this 
report went to press.82  
 
This case shows that too much focus on marketing and the purchasing of other businesses and 
not enough attention to key research were the reasons for the long-term damage that Glaxo 
suffered. It was a risky and unreasonable decision. The reasoning presented in the Kay 
Review, despite its subjectivity in relating to the Glaxo case, constitutes an evaluation that 
can be used by the boards in each legal system during the decision-making process in order to 
avoid destructive decisions. Excessive marketing might be the result of a spontaneous, one-
off decision or of an erroneous longer-term strategy. According to the Kay Review, bad long-
term decisions provide examples of short-termism, which can manifest itself in hyperactivity. 
83   Excessive marketing – understood as an over-concentration on the issues related to 
marketing – could be an example of it. 
The question arises as to why companies decide to promote their products and 
services excessively. The justifications for such decisions can vary. A lack of funds for the 
development of new products might be one of the reasons why a company focuses on 
marketing established products rather than on developing new ones. 84 Another reason might 
be a conviction that it is actually beneficial for the company and for example used to promote 
a newly established, developing or failing corporation or perceived as a way of attracting new 
investments. In the pharmaceutical industry, where competition is high, advertisement of a 
product is vital.  
The other justification for associating excessive marketing negatively comes from 
online marketing. The survey shows that half of online customers connect to a brand via 
social network. However, a third of social media users disconnected from these brands 
subsequently (mostly because of aggressive adverts) and then associate them negatively.85 
Does excessive marketing always contribute to long-term damage and does it always 
constitute a short-term decision? Every case and every company is different, so an 
unequivocal answer is impossible. Naturally, as such, excessive marketing will not always 
have negative consequences for a company. For example, provocative and excessive 
                                                          
82 The Kay Review of the UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making: Final Report, para. 1.26 (2012) 
<www.bis.gov.uk/kayreview > accessed 12 December 2016. 
83 ibid, paras. 1.1,1.2., 1.24. 
84 ibid. para. 1.24. 
85 See: David Mielach, Slow and Steady Wins the (Social Media Marketing) Race (Business News Daily, 23 
March 2012) <www.businessnewsdaily.com/2247-social-media-backfire.html> accessed 12 December 2016. 
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marketing of the photographer Oliviero Toscani made Benetton famous and successful in the 
eighties.86  
On balance, what is the value of a case study on excessive marketing, knowing the 
contradictory opinions on it? Overall, a decision to invest excessively in marketing is 
negatively regarded and portrayed as a short-term decision in this paper, because it 
concentrates on one factor only. From a company’s perspective, sustainable development is 
key. Hence, over-concentration on one factor, like marketing for instance, is condemned as 
being too risky for the company. The decision to market excessively is portrayed as a short-
term decision both if it aims at immediate profit maximisation by shareholders or if it seeks to 
achieve goals other than immediate profit maximisation. The topic of marketing in the UK, 
Delaware and Germany is now examined in greater detail, in order to scrutinise whether there 
are any differences in the perception of it. 
4.2.3.2 The UK and Delaware 
Taking into account all of these points, it is rather unlikely that a decision to promote 
excessive marketing would form part of the content of a long-term principle in any of the 
jurisdictions under review. Although criticised in the Kay Review, it appears more likely to 
be taken in shareholder-orientated jurisdictions such as the UK and Delaware, than in 
Germany. Shareholders are arguably less risk-averse than the other stakeholders and therefore 
more likely to support and approve risky decisions.87 Excessive marketing is thus more likely 
to be perceived as a positive or necessary decision for the company, even if its development 
is not sufficiently balanced or there is not enough money to invest in research or staff. 
Therefore, arguably there are greater incentives for this decision to be taken in the UK and 
Delaware. 
Despite their superficial similarities, the position under UK and Delaware law is not 
identical. Delaware leans the most towards shareholder primacy: the interests of only one 
group will be considered by the powerful boards there. UK law likewise recognises the 
ultimate interests of shareholders, but the interests of other stakeholders are also taken into 
account, although not enforceable. More consideration (at least in theory) is given to the 
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interests of other stakeholders in comparison with Delaware. Therefore, there are fewer 
incentives for such decision to be taken in the UK. 
It is reasonable to argue that excessive marketing is a lawful activity in both 
jurisdictions, although it might contribute to a breach of directors’ duties. In the UK, directors 
can only be sued according to s. 172 CA 2006 if it can be proved that they did not promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. In Delaware, even 
unfavourable directors’ decisions are protected by the business judgment rule unless the 
plaintiff can prove that a director did not act in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.88 This will be extremely challenging. 
4.2.3.3 Germany 
In Germany, the interests of various stakeholders should be considered before decisions are 
taken. As has been established in the previous case studies, in Germany a decision can be 
taken only if it serves the continued existence and long-term (or lasting) profitability of the 
company. At this point, it is essential to underline an important remark made by Hohaus and 
Weber. These authors correctly argue that a lasting increase in value can be achieved through 
both long-term and short-term incentives: it is important that in the end, long-term incentives 
are generated and a lasting increase in value is achieved.89 Hence, short-term management 
strategies are naturally also allowed under German law given that they aim towards a 
subsequent creation of value for the company. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to expect that the 
decision to focus excessively on marketing in the case of an average corporation will 
contribute to the lasting profitability of the company. Moreover, it will be difficult to prove 
that such a decision balances the interests of various stakeholders, contributes towards 
consistent development and was taken in the best interests of the company. A decision to 
focus excessively on marketing is a strong example of short-termism under German law. 
There are weaker incentives for excessive marketing in Germany and as such, it is less likely 
that such decision would be taken there since it is not consistent with the corporate objective. 
It is not an unlawful activity in itself but it might contribute to a breach of the directors’ 
duties. If the marketing strategy is unsuccessful, the members of the management board will 
find protection under the business judgment rule unless they did not act in the best interests of 
the company. 
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Can it be argued that ‘appropriate’ marketing (i.e. reasonable and balanced marketing) will be 
a positive decision for a company in the longer-term? It is extremely hard to distinguish 
between destructive and favourable marketing and to define what constitutes appropriate 
marketing.  It seems more likely that balanced and well-planned marketing will contribute to 
the long-term sustainable development of companies in every jurisdiction.90  
This case study highlights the importance of well-balanced and well-thought-out 
decision-making and the dangers associated with disproportionate decisions. However, it 
should also be noted that extreme (and short-term) decisions are not always harmful. 
Decisions may not always be negatively (or short-term) orientated: the context is important. It 
is reasonable to assume that the word ‘excessive’ evokes negative associations. Greater 
incentives are supplied by the law in the UK and Delaware than in Germany to take a 
decision that focuses on excessive marketing, but it appears to be a lawful activity in all three 
jurisdictions and it can only contribute to the breach of duties. 
4.2.4 Case Study 4: A Lack of Focus on Environmental and Health and Safety Issues 
4.2.4.1 Introduction 
The next case study draws its inspiration from the BP oil spill of 20 April 2010 in the Gulf of 
Mexico, which was connected to a lack of focus on environmental and health and safety 
issues. The BP oil spill case was discussed in the Kay Review 91  and in the academic 
literature.92 An examination of different factors that are not immediately linked to profit 
maximisation is particularly interesting in the context of stakeholder v. shareholder 
discussions. It illustrates how these debates evaluate the broader factors against the corporate 
objective. That environmental and health and safety arguments should be of critical 
importance for corporations or for society as a whole is rarely challenged. This case study 
also shows how focusing on these factors contributes to the long-term development of the 
                                                          
90  Sustainable marketing is portrayed as ‘an attempt to broaden the concept of marketing beyond simple 
economic (monetary) development; it seeks to give marketing a morality and accountability.’ Lynette Ryals, 
Issues in Sustainable Marketing in David Grayson, Nadine Exter, Cranfield on Corporate Sustainability, 119 
(Sheffield England: Greenleaf Publishing, 2012).  
91 Kay Review, supra n 82, ch 1. 
92 Strine, supra n 42, 136-139; Nick Lin-Hi et al., The Relationship between Corporate Governance, Global 
Governance, and Sustainable Profits: Lessons Learned from BP 11 (5) Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society 571 (2011). 
28 
 
company. The environmental and health and safety issues in the UK, in Delaware and in 
Germany will now be reviewed. 
4.2.4.2 The UK 
There is evidence that BP was aware of some safety concerns prior to the accident but these 
risks were ignored for economic reasons.93 The Kay Review argued that BP’s insufficient 
concern for environmental and health issues and cost pressures contributed to a series of 
accidents in North America of which the one in the Gulf of Mexico was only the most 
infamous.94 The spill had many negative consequences. Undeniably, not only did BP suffer 
direct financial losses, but also damage to its image. BP’s internal investigation concluded 
that ‘no single cause was responsible for the accident.’95 The evidence suggests that focussing 
on short-term profits and disregarding environmental and health and safety issues are among 
the possible reasons for the disaster. Lin-Hi and Blumberg noted that BP the oil spill did not 
happen because of bad governance rules or an absence of rules, but that instead it was a result 
of an improper incorporation of these rules into the running of the company. 96 It is also the 
view of this author that corporate sustainability was not safeguarded in BP, in the sense that 
the company was willing to take excessive risks in order to generate immediate profits, rather 
than realise sustainable, 97 i.e. long-term profits.  
Hence, it is pertinent to note that the BP oil spill case is an example of a short-term 
decision under UK law, as it has been taken to generate profits and presumably, the long-term 
effects or wider factors were not properly analysed. Section 172 (1) (d) underlines the 
importance of the ‘impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment,’ but the board is only obliged to ‘have regard’ to these factors. Thus, the 
paramount importance of the shareholders’ interests suggests that UK law might supply 
reasonably strong incentives for environmental and health and safety issues to be disregarded. 
A lack of focus on these issues can contribute to a breach of directors’ duties only if there is a 
failure to comply with any other legal duty imposed on the directors.   
                                                          
93 Congress of the United States, Official letter to BP CEO Tony Hayward (2010) 
<http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-20100614-LetterToHayward.pdf> accessed 12 
December 2016. 
94 Kay Review, supra n 82, para. 1.22. 
95http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/gulf-of-mexico-restoration/investigations-and-legal-proceedings.html> 
accessed 12 December 2017. 




It is understandable that a decision to concentrate on environmental issues might have 
been unpopular with shareholders, as it is quite unlikely that it would produce immediate 
profits. On balance, the BP oil spill case proves the contrary. This case is presented here to 
educate stakeholders, inasmuch as it shows that it is indeed in shareholders’ and directors 
interests to recognise these issues, as otherwise this oversight might generate costs, result in 
the failure of profits to materialise, and potentially diminish shareholder value.  
Overall, the accident in the Gulf of Mexico shows that decisions that undervalue 
environmental and health and safety issues can have serious, negative consequences for 
companies. A lack of focus on environmental and health and safety issues is a sign of short-
term thinking under UK law and, in the case of BP; it obviously harmed the company’s 
reputation. As such, consideration of health and safety and environmental factors would 
likely constitute an example of long-term thinking in the given scenario.  
4.2.4.3 Delaware 
Under Delaware law, a lack of consideration of environmental and health and safety issues is 
likely to be treated as an example of short-termism. Importantly, Strine claims that this case 
emphasises ‘a natural tendency to pay attention to short-term profits over long-term risks.’ 98 
In practice, however, it is highly likely that the interests of shareholders rather than the 
condition of the environment would be of paramount importance in this jurisdiction. In this 
context, Strine points out correctly that ultimately it is expected that managers are 
accountable to shareholders regardless of ‘community values.’ 99  Although it may be 
negatively regarded in the local communities or in the literature, any decision that fails to 
consider environmental factors is still likely to be consistent with Delaware’s corporate 
objective (assuming the director can prove that he was acting in the best interests of the 
corporation). Thus, in Delaware there are greater incentives for the board to disregard 
environmental and health & safety issues in comparison to two other systems. In contrast to 
the UK, consideration of the environmental issues is not even articulated in this jurisdiction’s 
legislation. 
Moving now to the board’s responsibility, directors’ decisions are protected in 
Delaware by the business judgment rule. Obviously, this rule cannot save directors from a 
finding of a breach of duty if they favour their own personal interests and are not acting in the 
best interests of the company. Nonetheless, this case scenario shows that a disregard for 
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environmental and health and safety issues can contribute to a breach of directors’ duties. It is 
argued that a change of focus from short-term to long-term shareholder value, apart from 
consideration of the wider factors (which is not mandatory in Delaware), makes a 
contribution towards minimising the risk of taking such decisions under Delaware law in the 
future.   
4.2.4.4 Germany 
Although shareholders’ interests are vital under German law, its tendency to safeguard the 
interests of wider stakeholders affected by corporate conduct means that it would arguably be 
more reluctant to put environmental and health and safety issues at stake (even if they cannot 
be the sole point of reference). Hopt has argued consistently that shareholders are the equity 
investors, and since they take the business risks, their interests should prevail.100 Therefore, it 
might be argued that under German law directors might have taken the decision because they 
wanted to concentrate on profit maximisation for shareholders. In the case of BP, that 
decision was not really taken in the shareholders’ best interests; it was detrimental to them 
and at the same time it undervalued environmental and health and safety issues. Hopt’s 
argument has also been criticised in the literature as creditors and employees also bear certain 
risks.101 There is a strong line of argument that invokes the concept of the benefit of the 
corporation: the management board is obliged to pursue the interests of the entire corporation 
and not individual shareholders.102 Therefore, the argument under German law is clearly that 
the undervaluation of environmental and health and safety issues benefits neither the 
corporation as a whole nor individual stakeholders and it is inconsistent with the corporate 
objective. Seen from this perspective, the incentives for such a decision to be taken under 
German law are weaker, as demonstrated by the secondary literature; if this is the case, it 
would be clearly an example of short-termism, as it concentrates on the shareholders’ short-
term gains. It is also probable that it might contribute to a breach of directors’ duties, if the 
management board was not acting in the best interests of the company or did not fulfil other 
duties. This, in turn, would prevent a member of the management board from relying on the 
business judgment rule to shield him/her from liability. 
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The BP oil spill case caused public outrage. The hope is that this unfortunate incident will 
encourage corporations all over the world, and especially directors,103 to pay more attention 
to the consequences of their management’s decisions and their effects in the longer and 
shorter term. The most important conclusion is that there is a link between consideration of 
broader factors, the consequences of directors’ decisions in the long-term and good corporate 
governance. The concentration only on net profits can be very costly. The lack of focus on 
environmental and health and safety issues is likely to be an example of short-term thinking, 
in all jurisdictions and in slightly stronger terms in German law. Although a lack of 
consideration of environmental and health and safety issues does not itself constitute a breach 
of directors’ duties, it can contribute to this breach considerably. 
4.2.5 Case Study 5: Promotion of Cultural, Social and Civic Aims 
4.2.5.1 Introduction 
The final issue to be analysed in this section is whether the decision to promote cultural, 
social and civic aims has a long-term or short-term impact on a company. Consideration of 
these aims appears to be even more loosely connected to the contribution to the company’s 
financial growth, making their prioritisation by a company much more controversial. It does 
not usually bring any immediate profits for the company. Promotion of all these social aims is 
only possible when the company is doing well and when there are some funds allocated for it. 
Therefore, the question arises whether it is beneficial for the directors of a company to take 
such a decision, how great the incentives are for it and whether both shareholder and 
stakeholder-orientated jurisdictions are likely to support it. It is argued that this decision 
might be beneficial for the company in any jurisdiction, if it supports rational aims and when 
it is well thought through. The justification for it might be that it is a long-term investment for 
the company. If it is successful, the investment will generate positive effects for the company 
and it will improve its image. In this section, the discussion centres on whether any particular 
corporate objective is more likely to furnish an opportunity to justify such a decision. The 
legal position in Germany, the UK and Delaware will be analysed in turn. 
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This final scenario is inspired by German case law. There is evidence that German case law 
acknowledges the importance of cultural, social and civic aims. In a prominent judgment 
from 2001, the BGH stated that not all financial contributions supporting art, science, social 
services or sport made by the management board constitute a breach of §266 StGB (Criminal 
Code) on embezzlement and breach of trust.104 The ultimate aim of being a ‘good corporate 
citizen’ is to improve the company’s financial situation.105 The financial and not-for-profit 
goals are not perceived as contradictory but complementary and it is emphasised that 
companies also use sponsorship of cultural and sporting events for advertising purposes, 
without economic justification.106 The German courts have also emphasised the interests of 
the enterprise as a binding guiding principle for the management board. 107  In another case, 
the BGH noted that the management board does not possess unlimited liberty to contribute 
towards cultural, social and civic aims. The management board should act, first of all, in the 
interests of the enterprise, ensuring that any disposal of company’s assets is consistent with 
the duty of loyalty.108  
These cases suggest that social aims cannot constitute the only justification for the 
decision since decisions should above all serve the interests of the enterprise. However, the 
directors’ duties are not breached in cases when the board supports social goals. 109 It has 
been stressed on many occasions in this paper that the management board must always act in 
the best interests of the company and ensure its lasting existence and success. Therefore, 
clearly, if this condition is fulfilled, the management board is protected by the business 
judgment rule and it can also promote cultural, social and civic aims. It is pertinent to note 
that supporting broad social aims can contribute towards this long-term profit rule. 
Being a ‘good corporate citizen,’ apart from its charitable role, might be beneficial for 
the company in the longer term. In Germany, assuming the condition that this decision is well 
thought through, it is highly likely that it will constitute a positive long-term investment, an 
example of long-term decision-making and that such a decision will not constitute a breach of 
directors’ duties. Hence, clearly the German law incentivises the board to promote cultural, 
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social and civic aims. It is a distinctive feature of the German jurisdiction that, although the 
financial situation of a company is without doubt of paramount importance under German 
law, non-financial goals are also prioritised (maybe only in theory). Such an approach may 
well lead towards the more balanced development for the company, which is one of the 
prerequisites of long-term decision-making. 
4.2.5.3 The UK and Delaware 
The position in the other two jurisdictions is slightly different. Consideration of cultural, 
social and civic aims does not attract as many court rulings in Delaware or in the UK in the 
context of the directors’ duties. The decision to support cultural, social and civic aims can 
also be taken under UK and Delaware law; however, in these systems incentives for such 
decisions are weaker and not as obvious as under German law. These reflections bring to 
mind the notion of corporate social responsibility, and its role under UK and Delaware law. 
  Traditionally it is argued that under Delaware law corporations should be run in order 
to maximise shareholder value. If a decision that promotes social, civil and cultural aims does 
not contribute to shareholder profit maximisation, it is less likely that it will be taken. 
However, if the decision is beneficial for shareholders, it is more possible to be taken and if 
taken, most likely it will be an example of long-termism. Hence, Delaware law supplies 
reasonably weak incentives for such a decision. To illustrate this point, Eisenberg claims that 
General Motors benefits in the same way from sponsoring documentaries for public 
television as it would from ‘a conventional corporate commercial.’110 Eisenberg frankly states 
that ‘frequently a corporation can earn greater profits by appearing to be philanthropic than 
by appearing to maximize.’111 As such, despite the shareholder value orientation of Delaware 
law, the promotion of social, cultural or civic aims naturally also constitutes a lawful activity. 
What is more, the business judgment rule in Delaware generally protects decisions that 
promote interests other than profit maximisation if such decisions are justified and well 
thought out. 
The position under UK law differs slightly. The ESV principle requires consideration of 
various factors. At least in theory, the board in the UK is strongly encouraged to consider 
these broader social aims. Therefore, in comparison with Delaware law, the incentives for the 
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promotion of cultural, social and civic aims in UK law are stronger.  Despite that, it is likely 
that the final result will be similar to the position in Delaware. The cultural, social and civic 
aims can only be taken into account if they are beneficial for the shareholders. This point is 
clearly illustrated in the Parke v Daily News (No. 2),112  where it was held that a company's 
funds cannot be applied in making ex gratia payments to the company’s workers. In general, 
all transactions must benefit the company, i.e. its shareholders.  
Arguably, shareholders will profit from this decision if it enhances the company’s 
corporate reputation. In the case of the promotion of cultural, social and civic aims, that 
would possibly happen in the longer-term. Nevertheless, as it does not generate immediate 
profits, the UK law supplies weaker incentives for the promotion of social, cultural and civic 
aims. This decision will be a lawful activity, unless it can be proved that directors were not 
aiming to promote the company’s success. 
 
4.2.5.4 Conclusions 
Decisions that promote cultural, social and civic aims can be taken in all three jurisdictions, 
without necessarily generating a breach of directors’ duties. However, past experience and 
the characteristics of German law suggest that it is more probable that they will be taken in 
this jurisdiction, since the incentives supplied by the law are stronger. If a decision is justified 
and reasonable it is very likely that it will constitute an example of long-term thinking in all 
legal systems. The common feature under the three jurisdictions is that social aims cannot 
constitute the only justification during the decision-making process. A decision must also be 
economically viable in the sense that it contributes to the company’s economic and financial 
development. The difference between the jurisdictions consists in the extent to which these 
social aims are considered. Arguably, they are of higher importance under German law than 
under the two other jurisdictions but the UK’s s. 172 CA 2006 explicitly underlines the 
importance of wider factors in decision making, so it ranks above Delaware law. 
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5. Share Ownership Structure and the Parameters of Long-Termism. 
5.1. Share Ownership Structure in the Countries under Review 
5.1.1. Introduction 
Having marshalled the shareholder v. stakeholder debate in section 4 as a means of drawing 
up specific examples of long-term and short-term decision-making, the discussion now turns 
to an analysis of share ownership structures in companies. This section scrutinises whether 
there is an interrelationship between ownership structure and the parameters of long-termism. 
It evaluates how various forms of shareholder ownership influence the time horizon of the 
board’s decision-making. The nature and structure of share ownership of public corporations 
differs worldwide. Publicly traded corporations traditionally have either concentrated or 
dispersed patterns of share ownership.113 The common law jurisdictions of the UK and the 
US are characterised as predominantly dispersed shareholding jurisdictions, which are 
sometimes also referred to as ‘outsider’ or ‘arm’s length systems.’ 114  The continental 
European civil law jurisdictions, like Germany, are described as concentrated (blockholding) 
shareholding structures or ‘insider’ systems.115  
This section will first provide more details to clarify the underpinnings of the agency 
problem and the link between it and the parameters of long-termism. Subsequently, it will 
present two practical examples of long- and short-termism in the form of case studies (i.e. 
focus on a dividend growth and investment in research). By introducing the case studies and 
comparing their practical effects in the UK, Delaware and Germany, this section will shed 
some light on the content of long-termism. The structure of the gap-filling exercise is similar 
to that adopted in section 4 above. The origins of the case study and its connections with the 
debate on share ownership structure of the company will be presented. Weight will be 
ascribed to whether a particular decision constitutes an example of long- or short-termism in 
each jurisdiction and how likely it is that it will be taken. The lawfulness of these decisions 
will be examined and in the case of short-term decisions and a potential breach of directors’ 
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duties, a breach of s. 172 CA 2006 and the relevant sections in the other jurisdictions is 
assessed.116 Finally, each case study offers comparative conclusions. 
5.1.2 The Agency Problem and the Parameters of Long-termism 
A discussion on share ownership structure is inevitably connected to the different 
distributions of the ‘agency problem’ or ‘agency costs.’ When one party – the agent – is 
enjoined to act on behalf of another party – the principal – there is the danger that he will act 
in his own personal interest rather than pursue the interests of the principal.117  The agency 
problem prevalent in the dispersed common law jurisdictions – like the UK and Delaware – is 
called a ‘vertical’ problem. It involves the conflict between the firm’s owners, i.e. 
shareholders as a class (principals) and its hired managers (agents). Efficiency reasons 
suggest conferring extensive powers on the board of directors rather than allocating them to 
the shareholders. The central problem is whether the board will act in its own personal or 
shareholders’ interests.118 In a concentrated shareholding structure, like Germany, the agency 
problem is ‘horizontal,’ involving a conflict between the owners who possess the majority 
interest in the company (agents) and the minority owners (principals). The main agency 
problem ensures that the interests of the former are prioritised at the expense of the latter.119  
This brings us to the central issue of this section: whether there is a link between the 
share ownership structure and agency problems on the one hand and the content of long-
termism on the other. There are two observations to be made here. Firstly, the tensions in 
play during the decision-making processes adopted by directors will differ according to 
whether a jurisdiction is an ‘outsider’ or ‘insider’ system. The UK and Delaware jurisdictions 
suffer from conflicts of interests between directors and shareholders. The directors exercise 
broad-decision making powers and therefore the danger arises that they will pursue their own 
short-term interests rather than the interests of the shareholders. Shareholders in these 
jurisdictions are weak and dispersed with divergent interests. If investors are short-term 
orientated, managers will also be incentivised to act in the short-term.120 On the other hand, if 
shareholders are long-term focused and directors short-term orientated or the other way 
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round, shareholders might struggle to convince the board to follow their advice. Shareholders 
might exert pressure to oust the board, but they would need the support of other shareholders 
for such a course of action to succeed. Alternatively, they might leave the company by selling 
their shares on the open market, which is a much easier option. In the dispersed ownership 
jurisdictions, it is more beneficial for shareholders to be apathetic and sell out, because of the 
high costs of monitoring management.121 
In Germany, management boards are strongly influenced by the dominant 
shareholders who may take advantage of their control to undermine minority shareholders’ 
interests. This suggests that in Germany a majority shareholder is most likely to be a major 
source of short-termism during decision-making, as the board is less powerful. Although they 
provide a source of short-termism, minority shareholders exert less impact on the decision-
making process. It is not claimed here that conflicts between majority and minority 
shareholders are less harmful, but it is observed that they are less visible in the context of 
decision-making by the board. Large shareholders are therefore in a very good position to 
influence the decision-making process. It is questionable whether they will promote their own 
interests, the interests of the other shareholders or the wealth of the company as a whole. 
Shareholders in the blockholding jurisdictions are characterised as having longer time-
horizons and this increases the scope of opportunity for the management board to invest for 
the long-term. 122  However, long-term controlling investors are not without their 
shortcomings. For instance, long-term investments are often associated with a focus on 
growth in market share, at the cost of a lower rate of return on equity investment.123 It is 
difficult to state unambiguously that concentrated ownership jurisdiction is per se more long-
term focused. The interests of majority shareholders can vary. However, the decision-making 
process in a concentrated ownership jurisdiction appears to be aligned more closely with the 
interests of majority shareholders rather than directors and it is less likely that the particular, 
short-term interests of directors will prevail. Therefore, it is pertinent to note that the goals 
pursued by majority shareholders should be uniform, coherent and thereby more long-term 
orientated. Majority shareholders, being more long-term focused, are less likely to put short-
term pressure on the management board.  
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The second issue to address is whether it is more likely that a board will act on its 
own and/or short-term interests in concentrated or dispersed ownership jurisdictions. 
Although it is difficult to generalise and still directors are fiduciaries, they are more powerful 
in dispersed ownership systems. Directors in the UK and Delaware might pursue their own 
interests more often and hence, there is a danger that they will have more opportunities to 
promote short-term goals there rather than the interests of the company as a whole. In 
comparison, concentrated shareholders are able to take effective decisions themselves. A 
management board is a decision-making body in Germany and large shareholders can more 
effectively demand accountability for the decisions taken by it. Therefore, in a concentrated 
jurisdiction, a key issue is whether these large shareholders are acting in their own interests or 
whether they are pursuing the interests of the shareholders as a whole.124 It is not the case that 
short-termism does not exist in concentrated jurisdictions. Rather, it is argued here that short-
termism traditionally arises from internal distortions of the corporation. The board is less 
powerful and it will have fewer options to promote its own short-term interests.  
5.1.3. Conclusions 
The variable of ‘share ownership structure’ adds another layer to the discussion on the 
content of long-termism. It can be used as a means of demonstrating how the interplay of 
various groups, e.g. majority v. minority shareholders (in Germany) and the board of 
directors and shareholders as a class (in the UK and Delaware) can influence the decision-
making process in the corporations and the content of long-termism. The theory of agency 
problems suggests that tensions arising between shareholders and directors in companies 
operating in dispersed ownership jurisdictions are more likely to be a source of short-termism 
during decision-making processes. The agency problem in concentrated jurisdictions does not 
affect decision-making directly. However, undeniably, it has an indirect effect as powerful, 
majority shareholders influence the board significantly. The case-based approach adopted in 
this paper aims to analyse whether this theoretical analysis correctly predicts reality.  
                                                          
124 Hopt et al., supra n 118, 303-304.  
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5.2. Practical Examples of Long- and Short-Termism 
5.2.1 Case study 1: A Focus on Dividend Growth  
5.2.1.1 Introduction 
This section examines the extent to which boards of directors are involved in the distribution 
of dividends, and especially whether such decision constitutes an example of long-term or 
short-term thinking. It also analyses whether a decision to focus on dividend growth is 
especially aligned with a particular share ownership structure in any given jurisdiction. A 
decision to focus on dividend growth is pivotal for shareholders, as it suggests financial 
benefits. At the same time, the distribution of profits or investment of these profits in research, 
development or any other purposes determines the future of the whole company.125  The 
distribution of dividends is mentioned in the context of differentiating between long-term and 
short-term decision-making126 and this case study is derived from these discussions in the 
academic literature. 
The decision to focus on dividend growth is presented in the context of the share 
ownership structure debate as it illustrates not only difficulties related to the corporate 
objective but also depicts particularly well the different agency problems which arise within 
companies in these jurisdictions. This case study concentrates on the tensions within the 
company among different groups regarding the distribution of dividends. A corporate 
decision to focus on dividend growth in Delaware, the UK and Germany will now be 
addressed. 
5.2.1.2 Delaware 
Pursuant to the DGCL, the board of directors exercises broad decision-making powers unless 
the certificate of incorporation of the corporation provides otherwise. 127  Delaware 
traditionally embraces shareholder primacy combined with director primacy.128 The board 
has the default powers regarding the declaration and payment of dividends within the limits 
                                                          
125 For the analysis of reasons why companies are actually paying dividends see: Fischer Black, The Dividend 
Puzzle 2(2) Journal of Portfolio Management 5 (1976); H Kent Baker et al., Revisiting the Dividend Puzzle: Do 
all of the Pieces Now Fit? 11 Review of Financial Economics 241, 243-247 (2002). 
126 See e.g.: Andrew Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is it Fit for Purpose? 23 (2010) 
Centre for Business Law and Practice School of Law, University of Leeds, Working Paper 
<www.law.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/events/directors-duties/keay-the-duty-to-promote-the-success.pdf> 
accessed 12 December 2016. 
127 §141 (a) (1) DGCL. 
128 Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance 97 Northwestern 
University Law Review 547, 550 (2003). 
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of the law.129 The main agency problem in Delaware occurs between the board of directors 
and shareholders as a class. Since directors are solely responsible for dividend distribution 
and shareholders are generally interested in dividend growth, divergent interests might lead to 
tensions. As established in section 4 above, the corporate objective in Delaware is to 
maximise shareholder wealth. It is quite clear that shareholders are interested in dividend 
growth even if it does not translate into a company’s sustainable development130  or has 
negative consequences. Managing for the long term is at the same time often ‘antithetical’ for 
the board, as directors ‘only have a temporary interest in the company, primarily limited to 
their time in the job’ and they are not rewarded for making long-term plans, as their 
successors will be likely to benefit from them.131 Therefore, it is not only the directors’ duty 
to maximise shareholder wealth but it will be usually beneficial for directors to produce 
immediate profits for shareholders. The board is not only solely responsible for the 
distribution of dividends, but they also have more space to pursue their own interests. It is 
likely that directors might choose to focus on dividend growth in Delaware and they are 
strongly incentivised to do so, although shareholders are weak. 
If it is the only or the main justification for a decision, the payment of excessive 
dividends is likely to constitute an example of short-termism. It is a challenge to determine 
how much profit directors can distribute and not be accused of short-termism though. For 
example, the distribution of all annual profits at one extreme end of the spectrum would 
indicate short-term thinking. Other cases are harder to define and it is almost impossible to 
state objectively how the dividend should be ascertained, in order to constitute an example of 
long-termism, apart from saying that such distributions should be balanced and reasonable.  
If directors are not willing to increase dividend growth, is it likely that shareholders 
will put short-term pressure on directors and demand earnings growth?  It is quite likely that 
shareholders will pressurise the board but they might struggle to do so effectively, as the 
diffused ownership structure means that the shareholders are weak and their interests are less 
coherent, more diverse and particular. Although arguably profit maximisation may unite them 
                                                          
129 §170 (a) (1), (2) DGCL. See also §171 – 174 DGCL. 
130 However, the recent research points out that companies in the US which adopted sustainability policies 
significantly outperform their counterparts over the long-term, both in terms of stock market as well as 
accounting performance. Robert Eccles et al., The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational 
Processes and Performance (2011) Harvard Business School Working Paper 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1964011> accessed 3 March 2017. 
131 Andrew Keay, The Global Financial Crisis: Risk, Shareholder Pressure and Short-termism in Financial 
Institutions. Does Enlightened Shareholder Value Offer a Panacea? 10 (2011) Centre for Business Law and 
Practice School of Law, University of Leeds Working Paper 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1839305> accessed 12 December 2016. 
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eventually, alternatively they can leave the company by selling their shares. Shareholders will 
also find it difficult to remove a director, unless they can coalesce sufficient shareholder 
support to command a majority of the shares.132 
Due to the directors’ broad decision-making powers in shaping the dividend 
distribution in Delaware, abuses that lead to short-term decisions are likely. It is also highly 
unlikely that focus on dividend growth itself will constitute a breach of directors’ duties, if 
directors are acting in the best interest of the company and they are fulfilling other duties. 
The business judgment rule suggests that courts are not going to second-guess the decision of 
a well-motivated and non-conflicted director. Nevertheless, concentration solely on dividend 
growth has been criticised in the literature. For instance, Greenfield emphasises that a 
company will be focusing on the short-term when it cuts research and development in order 
to increase dividends or retains ‘earnings temporarily at a cost to the long-term health of the 
company.’133 This is a vivid juxtaposition of short-term and long-term decision-making.  
5.2.1.3 The UK 
The board of directors in the UK does not enjoy such broad decision-making powers as 
directors under Delaware law regarding dividend distribution. The CA 2006 discusses 
dividends and their distribution only to a limited extent. According to s. 830 (1) and (2) CA 
2006, a company may only make a distribution out of profits available for the purpose.134 The 
creditor protection rules in the UK are in line with art. 17 of the Second Company Law 
Directive that distributions below subscribed capital are impermissible.135 The Companies 
Act 2006 also states that ‘[e]xcept in the case of a company entitled to the small companies 
exemption, the [directors’] report must state the amount (if any) that the directors recommend 
should be paid by way of dividend.’ 136 
The division of power between the board and shareholders regarding distributing 
dividends is left to be determined by the company’s articles of association. Every company in 
                                                          
132 §141 (k) DGCL. 
133 Kent Greenfield, The Origins and Costs of Short-Term Management, 28 (2009) 2nd Summit on the Future of 
the Corporation: Restoring the Primacy of the Real Economy 
<http://summit2020.org/paper-series.htm> accessed 12 December 2016. 
134 Section 831 (1), (2) CA 2006 stipulates when a public company can make a distribution and s 829 contains a 
definition of distribution. 
135 Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on coordination of 
safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of 
companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and 
alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent Text with EEA relevance. 
136 s 416 (3) CA 2006. 
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the UK can establish its own procedure regarding the distribution of profits. Thus, in theory, a 
company can arrange this in any form it likes and the board can be solely responsible. Davies 
et al. note though that it is unlikely that a board will be left to decide about the profits by 
itself (except interim dividends). If the articles are silent about the distribution of dividends, 
then shareholders alone will be responsible.137 However, companies can decide to incorporate 
Model Articles. According to these Model Articles, if the shareholders and the board of 
directors are currently involved in the distribution of dividends, the board plays a substantial 
role in the process. Importantly, the board initiates a decision on whether a dividend should 
be declared or profits should be affirmed and invested.138 The shareholders’ role is to affirm 
or reject such proposal as according to the articles, they declare the dividend – an ordinary 
resolution139 is required – and the directors may decide to pay interim dividends.140 Further, 
‘[t]he directors may pay at intervals any dividend payable at a fixed rate if it appears to them 
that the profits available for distribution justify the payment.’141  
The Model Articles allow shareholders by special resolution to ‘direct the directors to 
take, or refrain from taking, specified actions.’142 As such, with a 75% vote referred to as a 
special resolution, the shareholders can oblige the directors to declare a dividend, i.e. initiate 
a proposal themselves to declare a dividend. It is questionable, whether shareholders will be 
able to exercise their rights effectively due to the dispersed share ownership structure of most 
listed public limited companies in the UK, e.g. the collective action and co-ordination costs 
will likely be too high to marshal sufficient support.  
 Taking into account all of the above, the board in the UK is actively engaged in the 
actual distribution of dividends and exercises quite broad decision-making powers in that 
respect. However, the board is not as powerful as in Delaware and shareholders clearly have 
more influence to shape the board’s decision-making. Similar to the position in Delaware, 
conflicts regarding dividend distribution are likely to arise between these actors. This 
epitomises the agency problem in dispersed jurisdictions. Undeniably, tensions between the 
board and shareholders in some instances are very likely. In particular, the argument put 
forward by Keay is compelling that long term plans and investments can make directors’ 
                                                          
137  Paul Davies et al., Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 280 (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2016). 
138 Reg. 70 (2) Model Articles for Public Companies, incorporated on or after 28 April 2013. 
139 According to s 282 (1) CA 2006 ‘[a]n ordinary resolution of the members (or of a class of members) of a 
company means a resolution that is passed by a simple majority.’ 
140 Reg. 70 (1) Model Articles.  
141 Reg. 70 (6) ibid.  
142 Reg. 4 (1) ibid. 
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performance  look ‘decidedly average, as the share price might not increase and higher 
dividends would not be paid as quickly as if short-term plans were implemented.’ 143  
Therefore, it is the view of this author that in the UK, it might be tempting for the board to 
focus on dividend growth and produce immediate profits for shareholders – there are strong 
incentives in place for a decision to be taken to focus on dividend growth in this system. 
Some directors might however prefer to reinvest the profit. Further, it is highly likely that 
shareholders will also be interested in dividend distribution. In comparison to Delaware, 
shareholders in the UK might be slightly more successful in putting pressure on the board. 
Although shareholders are diffuse and traditionally perceived as weak, their influence on 
dividend distribution is higher in the UK, since they must approve the payment of a dividend 
by ordinary resolution. The board acting in the name of the company and investing for 
instance in the development of the company can meet with lack of shareholders’ approval if 
they prefer to receive a large dividend pay-out immediately. According to s. 168 (1) CA 2006, 
a director can be removed by an ordinary resolution if shareholders are not happy with 
decisions in relation to dividends. The shareholders’ influence on the board will depend on 
whether the former have at their disposal the required majority or can successfully pressurise 
the board in a different way. In a dispersed share ownership corporate governance system 
such as the UK, this is extremely unlikely. 
Overall, the directors’ paramount duty is to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of the members as a whole. Hence, even if the dividend policy is not beneficial for 
the company, it can contribute to a breach of directors’ duties only when it can be proved that 
the directors were not acting in the best interests of the company and when they are not 
complying with other duties. Nevertheless, on balance focusing solely on dividend growth 
should be perceived as an example of short-termism. It is criticised in the UK. Chapman aptly 
highlights that if the board uses limited company funds to finance the payment of dividends 
and share buybacks that might constitute a short-termist action.144 In contrast, a decision to 
distribute the profits sensibly would be more justified, and is more likely to constitute an 
example of long-term thinking.   
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In Germany, decisions on the appropriation of distributable profits are left to the 
shareholders. 145  These provisions are mandatory and §119 (1) 2 AktG notes that the 
shareholders’ meeting shall resolve on all matters including the appropriation of distributable 
profits. This rule is repeated in §174 (1) 1 AktG which provides that such resolution shall 
specify in detail the appropriation of distributable profits, including in particular: the amount 
of distributable profits, the amount to be distributed to shareholders, the amounts to be 
transferred to profit reserves, any profit carried forward, and any additional expense resulting 
from such resolution.146 The Second Company Law Directive prohibits distribution of profits 
below subscribed capital not only in the UK but also in Germany. According to the AktG, 
‘[d]ividends may not be paid for as long as the legal reserve and the capital reserve in 
aggregate do not amount to 10 per cent of the share capital.’147 Shareholders in Germany 
have more control over dividend distributions than in the UK or Delaware. Neither the 
management board nor the supervisory board is involved in deciding on the amount of 
dividends. However, the management board submits to the supervisory board a proposal 
regarding how to pay dividends out of distributable profits that is ‘intended to be presented to 
the shareholders’ meeting.’148 Every member of the supervisory board is ‘entitled to take 
cognisance of the documents submitted’ by the management board.149 Further, §58 (2) 1 
AktG provides that the management board and the supervisory board approve the annual 
financial statements. The management board is also obliged to supervise the distribution 
carefully, as according to §93 (3) 2 AktG the members of the management board are liable 
for damages if contrary to the AktG ‘shareholders are paid interest or dividends.’  
According to the current law, the management board in Germany can only suggest 
how the profit should be distributed and it is able to influence the process to a limited extent. 
The board’s point of view does not have to be considered by the shareholders and its role is 
definitely weaker in that respect than the board in the UK or Delaware. The fact that the 
board is accountable extensively to shareholders and closely overseen by the supervisory 
board means that its impact on the distribution of profits should be concentrated more on the 
interests of the company as a whole and arguably on the benefits to the majority shareholders. 
                                                          
145 §119 (1) 2; §174 (1) 1 AktG. 
146 §174 (2) ibid. 
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The majority shareholders are more long-term focused than the shareholders in dispersed 
jurisdictions, thus the management board in Germany should be also more long-term 
orientated, as it will be subject to less short-term pressure from shareholders. This confirms 
the theoretical analysis that Germany suffers from a horizontal agency problem; conflicts are 
likely to take place between majority and minority shareholders, as they might have different 
visions regarding profit distribution. 
Because the board does not have much impact on the distribution of profits in 
Germany, this case study is not relevant in the context of managerial long-term decision-
making. As such, owing to the marginal role of the management board, it does not contribute 
towards establishing the parameters of the managerial long-termism in Germany.  
Nevertheless, at the same time it is evident that at least dividend distribution will not be a 
source of managerial short-termism in Germany.  
5.2.1.5 Conclusions 
A balanced and responsible distribution of profits is likely to constitute a long-term decision 
that should be more beneficial for the company as a whole. Concentrating solely on dividend 
growth is likely to be an example of short-termism. This case study confirms that 
mechanisms regarding dividend distribution differ in the jurisdictions under review. Focus on 
the dividend distribution constitutes a clear example of short-termism in the UK and 
Delaware due to their dispersed ownership structure and the existence of the main agency 
conflicts between directors/managers and shareholders. In Delaware, directors are solely 
responsible for dividend distribution and in the UK, both shareholders and directors are 
involved in the process. In both jurisdictions, the distribution of dividends inevitably will lead 
to tensions between directors and shareholders, as a result of different goals and investment 
perspectives. Although criticised, such decision is likely to be a lawful activity in these 
systems. In Germany, on the other hand, the management board influences the distribution of 
dividends only in a very limited way. Hence, the decision on dividend policy is not that 
important in the context of the board’s decision-making or parameters of the long-termism.  
5.2.2 Case study 2: Investment in Research 
5.2.2.1 Introduction 
The first case study shows that focussing solely on dividend growth is likely to constitute an 
example of short-termism, at least in dispersed ownership jurisdictions. This is often 
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contrasted with a decision to invest in research and development, which will be the subject of 
the current case study.150 The decision to focus on research differs a lot from the first case 
study as it discusses discretionary expenses and it centres less on the company’s immediate 
financial growth. This is commonly supported in the literature and generally identified with 
long-term considerations and investment. 151  Naturally, decisions could turn out to be 
successful or unsuccessful. Interestingly, Jackson and Petraki argue that managers can be said 
to have a long-term orientation if they choose to invest in research and development of the 
company. On the other hand, the authors note that it can be ‘inherently risky in the sense that 
future benefits are uncertain.’152 
In any case, a lack of immediate profits is likely to be the reason behind a lower 
popularity of this decision among shareholders – especially when their profits are decreasing 
– and the boards might be reluctant to take them. The Kay Review suggests that there is a 
decline in the UK in investment in research and development as a percentage of GDP since 
1992. Comparatively, the US is the leader and Germany is the runner-up. 153 This case study 
looks at the connection between a decision to invest in research and the share ownership 
structure of the company and whether it is more likely for this decision to be taken in one 
jurisdiction or another. The topic of investment in research in Germany, the UK and 
Delaware will now be analysed in greater detail. 
5.2.2.2 Germany 
A number of incentives exist for a managerial decision to invest in research to be treated 
favourably under German law. Such conduct appears to be consistent with the corporate 
objective in this jurisdiction – assuming that the research is reasonable, it focuses on the 
lasting creation of value and it serves the interests of shareholders, employees and the general 
public. If this is the case, it will constitute a strong example of long-termism and would be 
encouraged in the academic literature. Secondly, if the management board is acting in the 
best interests of the company and is not breaching other duties, the decision is unlikely to 
                                                          
150 Sarah Kiarie, At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened Shareholder Value: 
Which Road Should the United Kingdom Take? 17(11) International Company and Commercial Law Review 
329, 334 (2006). 
151 Long-term investment does not only imply investment time horizons, but also its sustainability. See: Sigurt 
Vitols, Long-term Investment and the Sustainable Company: A Stakeholder Perspective, vol. III, 12 (Brussels: 
ETUI, 2015). 
152 Gregory Jackson, Anastasia Petraki, Understanding Short-Termism: The Role of Corporate Governance, 
Glasshouse Forum, 18 (2011) 
<www.sofi-goettingen.de/fileadmin/Textarchiv/WIP2/Praesentationen/jackson-petraki_short-termism.pdf> 
accessed 12 December 2016. 
153  Kay Review, supra n 82, para. 1.8 and fig 2. 
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constitute a breach of directors’ duties or contribute to the breach even if it is unsuccessful in 
the end. The board will be also protected by the business judgment rule.  
Further, it is worth noting that the ‘time preference conflict’ (Zeitpräferenzkonflikt) 
arises also in Germany between top management and shareholders as they often pursue 
different goals – Kräkel notes that ‘younger top managers have a strong preference for the 
present and they prefer short-term investments as they have just bought a house or got 
married.’154 Clearly, the management board can invest in research or decide against it, even if 
the majority shareholders oppose it. The board enjoys wide decision-making powers in 
managing the company, which means that it is not bound by any instructions from the other 
bodies or shareholders.155 At the same time, they are obliged to evaluate individual interests 
during decision-making and weigh them against connected risks.156 Furthermore, the board 
might be personally incentivised to invest in research. Their remuneration depends on the 
lasting development of the enterprise. 157  The Higher Regional Court (Frankfurt 
Oberlandesgericht) acknowledged in a recent ruling that broad decision-making powers 
entitle the management board to take decisions that happen to be contrary to the interests of 
the majority shareholders.158  
Nevertheless, it is likely that the majority shareholders will influence the decisions 
taken by the board in this concentrated jurisdiction and the interests of minority shareholders 
are likely to be marginalised. Wirth et al. argue convincingly that the management board does 
not have the power to withstand the strong influence of majority shareholders.159 Although it 
is not responsible for the management of the company, in practice the shareholders’ meeting 
influences its running. The management board must obtain the approval of the shareholders 
on many occasions and this reduces its autonomy. It is worth underlining though that 
shareholders in Germany are not entitled to remove a member of the management board, as 
according to §84 (3) 1 AktG, this is within the competence of the supervisory board only.160 
Fleisher notes that directors might feel incentivised ‘to take advantage of their 
superior information and to misappropriate corporate resources’ on the ground that direct 
                                                          
154 Matthias Kräkel, Organisation und Management, 280-281 (Mohr Siebeck, 2007) (author’s translation). 
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monitoring of the directors by the shareholders is often prohibitively costly.161 Naturally, the 
foregoing argument applies to all three jurisdictions under scrutiny. This tendency is more 
visible in the UK and especially in Delaware, due to the stronger position of the board in 
these jurisdictions, in comparison with Germany. As a consequence, the management board 
in Germany, due to its less active role, has fewer opportunities to promote its own interests. 
Majority shareholders are likely to be the key body in deciding on investing in 
research. This confirms the distribution of the agency problem in concentrated jurisdictions; 
however, in accordance with the corporate objective of companies under German law, the 
other stakeholders’ interests must be also considered. The crucial question in the present 
context is whether the powerful majority shareholders would be interested in investing in 
research. The interests of the majority shareholders will not always be identical to the 
interests of the enterprise as a whole. However, it appears that they will be more convergent 
and consistent with them than the interests of dispersed, individual shareholders. The 
majority shareholders are usually involved in the running of the company and they 
understand the relationships within and outside the company well; hence, they should be 
more interested in the company’s sustainable development and balanced growth. It is more 
likely that they will present a vision of the corporation that is more integrated and therefore 
long-term focused. This vision should also embrace investment in research.  
5.2.2.3 The UK 
Many commentators in the UK encourage boards to invest in research, pointing out that it is 
likely to contribute to the long-term success of the company. For instance, according to 
Parkinson, ‘[l]ong term profitability may depend on investing in research and development, 
capital equipment, and training.’162 Investment in research is traditionally perceived as a 
long-term decision in the UK. Naturally, it can also have detrimental effects for the company 
and some companies plough significant resources into research and development, the motive 
behind that investment may very well be rooted in short-term considerations. In the UK, there 
are slightly fewer incentives for such a decision than under German law. UK boards enjoy 
broad decision-making powers on how to promote the interests (and success) of the company 
and will also play a key role in deciding about investment in research and development. In 
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comparison to Germany, the board has more opportunities to pursue their own interests, 
owing to the dispersed nature of the shareholder body. Naturally, the main role of the board is 
to fulfil the corporate objective and ensure the protection of shareholders’ interests. It is 
questionable whether dispersed and diffuse shareholders will effectively put pressure on the 
board, if the latter wants to pursue different goals. Diffuse shareholders tend to be rather 
passive and weak in corporate governance and exercise their powers via the ‘exit’ choice and 
other market forces.163  
 Overall, the tensions regarding any possible investments in research will arise in the 
UK between the board and shareholders and it is argued that in this system the board’s 
approach towards investment in research is in the end crucial. How likely is that the boards 
will support the long-term development path of the company? Undeniably, some will be 
interested in pursuing this goal. However, it appears that in general, the board will be more 
interested in short-term investments and short-term profits, as this is clear evidence that they 
are successful managers and it makes their performance look better in the eyes of 
shareholders. If directors decide to invest in research or development, their decision will be 
most likely lawful. Dispersed shareholders that oppose investment in research might struggle 
to pressurise the board. As long as directors act in the best interest of the company and they 
do not breach any of their legal duties, the courts are unlikely to investigate ex post facto the 
substance of a business decision such as investment in research that turns out to be 
unsuccessful and unprofitable.  
5.2.2.4 Delaware  
In the US, investment in research has mostly positive connotations and it is believed that in 
general it contributes towards the long-term success of companies. According to Strine, the 
paramount objective for the for-profit corporation is ‘the generation of durable wealth for its 
stockholders through fundamentally sound economic activity’ and long-term endeavours like 
investment in research and development are one of the prerequisites for building durable 
wealth.164 Undeniably, some research investments can be unsuccessful. One of the main 
arguments against short-termism is that it discourages investments that offer a long-term 
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payback. Laverty contrasts decisions that concentrate on short-term gains (maximising 
quarterly profits) with long-term strategies, like for instance investment in basic research.165  
The decision to invest in research is likely to constitute an example of long-termism in 
Delaware as its objective goes beyond short-term profit maximisation. The solution under 
Delaware law mirrors to a great extent the position under the UK law, with the main agency 
conflicts arising between the board and the shareholders as a whole. Like the UK, Delaware 
has a dispersed ownership structure and also mostly the board will be mainly responsible 
there for determining whether the company will invest in research. The board in Delaware 
enjoys an even stronger position than in the UK.166 Thus, it will depend even more heavily on 
the board whether a long-term strategy as an investment in research will be pursued and 
shareholders in Delaware will find it harder than in the UK to pressurise the board to act in 
their interests, if directors are not willing to pursue their goals. 
In conclusion, is it likely that the board in Delaware will invest in research? The Kay 
Review suggests that investment in research is actually thriving in the US.167 Still, it might be 
difficult for the board to stand the short-term profits pressure, especially taking into account 
its corporate objective. The board of directors that exercises broad decision-making powers 
and is obliged to contribute to the shareholders’ profit maximisation might find it tempting 
and personally beneficial to promote decisions that give short-term profit rather than those 
which are long-term investments. There is a danger that investment in research and 
development will not be very popular in Delaware, because it does not bring immediate 
financial benefits to the shareholders. The incentives in Delaware to invest in research are 
average, at the most. If the board decides to invest in research, it seems unlikely that such a 
decision will be challenged based on a breach of directors’ duties; of course, this is assuming 
that the board acts in the best interests of the company and they do not breach the no-conflict 
and no-profit rules. The business judgment rule will protect well-meaning and rational 
decisions even if they do not maximise shareholder value and the investment turns out 
unsuccessful. The plaintiff will have to prove that one of the applicable duties was breached. 
5.2.2.5 Conclusions  
This case study underlines that a decision to invest in research is generally positively 
associated, is likely to be a lawful activity and constitutes an example of long-termism in all 
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three systems. In light of the share ownership patterns of the company in each of the three 
jurisdictions, it seems that there are much greater incentives for such a decision to be made in 
a concentrated, rather than a dispersed, ownership jurisdiction. It constitutes a stronger and a 
more vivid example of long-termism under German law due to the important role of the 
generally longer-term orientated majority shareholder in the decision-making process. In 
contrast, the board of directors – which is the body that is legally responsible for investment 
in research in the UK and Delaware – is in general more short-term focused. 
6. Conclusions Regarding the Gap-Filling Exercise 
6.1 Introduction 
It is now possible to piece together a better account of the content and nature of long-
termism. The case studies were presented in this paper to identify country-specific examples 
of both long-term and short-term decision-making. The case studies were drawn from two 
significant issues in corporate law scholarship, namely from the literature on the shareholder 
v. stakeholder theory debate and the secondary sources that address the relevance of the share 
ownership structure of a jurisdiction. This paper links the concept of long termism with the 
corporate objective and the agency problems within companies in these jurisdictions. The aim 
was to scrutinise these debates separately to identify and emphasise their influence on long-
termism. This concluding section is structured as follows. First, the table that summarises and 
illustrates the case studies and their findings is presented and its structure is explained. This is 
followed by comparative comments on the parameters of long-termism. Finally, some general 
comments on the notion of long-termism will be presented.  
6.2 The Table 











Table 1: Summary of the case studies 





Does it constitute a 
lawful activity or 
contribute to a 
breach of directors’ 
duties? 
- Does the law provide strong, 
average or weak incentives for such 
a decision to be taken? 
- Is it consistent with the corporate 
objective? /Does it confirm 
differences regarding agency 
problems? 
- Is it encouraged or criticised in the 
literature? 
Case study 1 – decision to focus on the share price 
Delaware  short-term 
decision 
Likely to be a lawful 
activity but might 
contribute to a breach. 
Strong incentives, especially if 
beneficial for shareholders. Criticised 




Lawful activity in 
general, can contribute 
to a breach. 
Strong incentives for such decision, 
appears to be consistent with the 
shareholder value maximisation (as 
long-term considerations and ESV are 
encouraged but not obligatory). 





It does not constitute 
illegal activity itself. 
However, it 
contributes strongly to 
a breach of directors’ 
duties and more so, 
than in the 
shareholder-orientated 
jurisdictions. 
German law provides weaker 
incentives for decisions to focus on the 
share price; not consistent with the 
corporate objective and it is criticised 
in the literature. 
Case study 2 - decision to aggressively reduce the carbon emissions from a company’s 
plant  
Delaware  long-term 
decision 
Likely to be a lawful 
activity. 
Weaker incentives – can only be taken 
if beneficial for shareholders. 
Consideration of long-term factors 
generally encouraged in the literature 
but the other factors can only be 




Likely to be a lawful 
activity. 
Weaker incentives – can only be taken 
if beneficial for shareholders; it 
appears to be consistent with the ESV. 
Long-term investments generally 
praised in the literature but lack of 




Likely to be a lawful 
activity. 
There are greater incentives for this 
decision to be taken in Germany than 
in other jurisdictions. Consistent with 
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termism the corporate objective. Sustainable 
development generally advocated in 
the literature, but lack of evidence on 
this specific example. 
Case study 3 – excessive marketing 
Delaware  example 
of short-
termism 
Likely to be a lawful 
activity, however it 
might contribute to a 
breach of duty. 
There are greater incentives for this 
decision, especially if beneficial for 




Likely to be a lawful 
activity, however it 
could contribute to a 
breach. 
There are incentives for this decision, 
however fewer than in Delaware; 
likely to be beneficial for shareholders 
and not consistent with the ESV. 





It does not constitute 
an unlawful activity in 
itself, but could 
contribute to a breach. 
There are fewer incentives provided 
by the law for this decision to be taken 
in Germany, or encouraged in the 
literature as weighing different 
interests is crucial. It does not seem to 
be consistent with the corporate 
objective. 




It does not constitute 
an unlawful activity in 
itself, but could 
contribute to a breach. 
There are greater incentives for this 
decision to be taken, consistent with 
corporate objective if it contributes to 
shareholder wealth maximisation. 





Unlikely to be a sole 
cause for the breach of 
directors’ duties but it 
could contribute to it. 
The UK law supplies reasonably 
strong incentives for such decision 
(but weaker than in Delaware); 
decision consistent with the letter but 
not with the spirit of the corporate 









It does not constitute 
illegal activity itself. 
However, it 
contributes stronger to 
the breach of 




Inconsistent with the corporate 
objective – hence fewer incentives; 
less likely to be encouraged in the 
literature. 







Likely to be a lawful 
activity. 
Weak incentives, but decision possible 
if profitable for shareholders (in one 
way or another). In general, supported 
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Likely to be a lawful 
activity. 
Incentives are weaker than in 
Germany but stronger than in 
Delaware, decision possible if 
profitable for shareholders; other 
factors considered subsequently. 





Highly unlikely to 
contribute to a breach. 
 
The law furnishes strong incentives for 
such decisions; consistent with 
corporate objective (however, social 
aims cannot be only justification for 
the decision, it must be beneficial for 
the enterprise) and supported in the 
literature. 





Unlikely to be a sole 
cause for the breach of 
directors’ duties but it 
could contribute to it. 
Agency problems between the board 
and shareholders as a class; directors 
solely responsible for dividend 
distribution. Strong incentives to focus 
on dividend growth despite weak 
shareholders. Abuses that lead to 
short-term decisions are likely. 










Unlikely to be a sole 
cause for the breach of 
directors’ duties but it 
could contribute to it. 
 
Shared division of power between the 
board and shareholders regarding 
distribution of dividends. Strong 
incentives to focus on dividend 
growth, despite dispersed ownership, 
shareholders are likely to put stronger 
pressure on the board than in 












Shareholders mainly responsible for 
dividend distribution and only a 
limited role for management; confirms 
agency conflicts between majority and 
minority shareholders.  Due to 
shareholders’ leading role not relevant 
in terms of the parameters of 
managerial long-termism in Germany. 
At the same time shows, that one 
source of short-termism appears to be 
excluded or at least limited. 






Unlikely to constitute 
a breach. 
 
The strongest position of the board 
among all jurisdictions and arguably 
the strongest short-term pressures – 
55 
 
fewer incentives for the decision to be 








Unlikely to constitute 
a breach. 
 
Encouraged in the literature. The 
board has a key role in deciding about 
investment in research and it is more 
interested in short-term investments. 
Shareholders are dispersed but 
stronger than in Delaware. Such 
decision is possible, fewer incentives 
than under German, but more than 







Unlikely to constitute 
a breach. 
The law supplies strong incentives for 
this decision. Long-term investments 
likely to be encouraged in the 
literature, lack of evidence on this 
specific example though. Due to 
strong influence of the majority 
shareholder on the board, the former 
attitude towards investment in 
research is crucial. 
 
This table contains four columns: firstly, information on jurisdiction, secondly, an indication 
as to whether this is an example of short-termism or long-termism. Subsequently, whether a 
given decision is a lawful activity and/or has a chance to contribute to the breach is analysed. 
The last column addresses whether there are weak or strong incentives furnished by the law 
for such a decision to be taken, whether it is encouraged or criticised in the literature and 
finally if it is consistent with the corporate objective (cases 1-5) or confirms differences 
regarding agency problems (cases 6 and 7). The table also specifies each case study that has 
been analysed. It is not surprising that the second column is crucial in the discussion on the 
content and scope of long-termism. The third and fourth columns are also important as they 
indicate differences and similarities between jurisdictions and they present the notion of long-
termism in a broader context. Moreover, currently the academic literature is the main source 
of evaluation whether the decision is an example of long- or short-termism; hence, it is vital 
to underline if it is criticised or encouraged by commentators.  
6.3 Conclusions 
The dearth of sources in the area of decision-making in all three jurisdictions indicates that it 
is difficult for directors or management boards to judge whether a specific decision is long-
term or short-term. It is a feature of all jurisdictions that legislation draws the legal command 
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as a standard and the courts are left to intervene at a later date to define long-termism in 
greater detail. Certainly, there is no need for a static definition of long-termism and there are 
also positive consequences associated with the fact that the notion is not precise, as it can be 
used flexibly in different contexts and situations. However, there should be more guidelines 
regarding its breadth. The principal conclusion that emerges in this paper refers to long-
termism being a flexible standard; hence, it must be evaluated in a specific case scenario. 
Creation of a list of factors or criteria that constitute a long-term managerial decision-making 
in every given situation is not possible. Case by case analysis enables us to put this subjective 
notion in context. It is argued strongly in this paper that it is the best way to establish the 
parameters of long-termism. Nevertheless, the case-based approach is not flawless, as without 
background knowledge it is difficult to estimate why decisions are taken.  
Of the seven case studies, three represent examples of long-termism and there are four 
examples of short-termism. The case studies have shown that jurisdictions are almost 
unanimous in the classification of examples, with the exception of the case regarding the 
decision to focus on dividend growth, which is not relevant in terms of managerial time-
horizons in Germany. However, the clarity of the examples and the probability that the 
decision will be taken differ. The case studies underline that long-termism is widely 
advertised and promoted in the academic literature and in general, it has positive associations. 
In principle, in all three jurisdictions the academic literature promotes long-term, sustainable 
development, notwithstanding that in practice, short-term decisions are likely to be taken. 
This is clearly illustrated in the case studies, which focus on the share price, dividend growth 
and the decision that fails to consider environmental and health and safety issues. 
Consideration of the long-term consequences involves an analysis of the positive and 
negative consequences of the decision – deliberation of the whole impact of a particular 
decision on the company.   
On balance, decisions to focus on share price and on dividend growth constitute the 
clearest examples of short-termism and the decision to invest in research is the most vivid 
example of long-termism. A focus on short-term profits is the main feature of short-termism 
according to the case studies (case studies 1, 4, 6). Further, the case study on excessive 
marketing underlines that short-termism is perceived as an over-concentration on one factor. 
The decisions to reduce carbon emissions, to promote social goals and to invest in research 
epitomise long-termism; thus, future investments are key features of long-termism. The other 
examples of long-term investments are ‘spending on employee training or the propensity to 
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retain staff during economic downturns.’168  It is almost impossible to state unambiguously 
which long-term investment will be beneficial for the particular company. As the case study 
on investment in research shows, such a decision can be also risky. 
A decision, which is not a form of long-term decision-making, is likely to be an 
example of short-termism. For instance, the case study on environmental and health and 
safety issues indicates that a lack of focus on these factors is likely to amount to a short-term 
decision. At the same time, it demonstrates that there is a link between consideration of 
broader factors and long-termism. Examples of short-termism are more frequent than 
examples of long-termism, if correctly identified; they can be useful in determining the 
content of long-termism, by indicating what type of behaviour should be avoided.  
It is still unclear whether short-term decisions are actually detrimental to long-term 
value creation169 and the meaning of short-termism is far from clear. Nevertheless, the gap-
filling exercise confirms that short-termism often involves decision-making of a quality that 
is less than the highest standard – which is difficult to demonstrate empirically. Focussing on 
short-term factors is unlikely to constitute the sole basis for a breach of directors’ duties, if 
disinterested directors act in good faith in the best interests of the company. The case studies 
show that it can at the most contribute to a breach. This makes it more difficult to determine 
the standard of a decision taken.  
The general pattern is that decisions that are considered as long-term 
decisions/investments are better balanced and have a more inclusive and holistic character. In 
the jurisdictions under scrutiny, long-termism is associated with the following words: 
reasonableness, well-thought through decision, balanced development, and decisions going 
beyond immediate profits and short-term shareholders’ interests. Long-termism is associated 
with forward thinking; consideration of what is profitable not only here and now but also in 
the future. It is worth recalling that long-termism is not the same as a successful decision. At 
the same time, unsuccessful decisions can be a result of short-termism, long-termism but also 
other external factors. This paper now presents some general comments on the notion of 
long-termism in a comparative perspective. 
6.4 Some General Thoughts  
Apart from enriching the discussion on the content of long-termism during directors’ 
decision-making, the analysis produced by the case studies also illustrates how complex the 
                                                          
168 Jackson, Petraki, supra n 152, 19, fn 4.  
169 ibid 17. 
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concept of long-termism is and why the perception of it varies between jurisdictions. The 
framework above can be illustrated in the following terms:  
Table 2:  General framework 
Jurisdiction Delaware the UK Germany 
Corporate 
objective 
shareholder value  
maximisation 
















 directors v. 
 shareholders as a 
class 
directors v. 
 shareholders as a 
class 
majority v. minority 
shareholders 
Very strong position 




Strong position of 
directors in this 
dispersed ownership 
jurisdiction; diffused 
shareholders, but more 
empowered than in 
Delaware 
Strong position of majority 
shareholder that is likely to 
influence the board 
Conclusions Directors have more 
power to pursue their 
own interests 
Directors have more 
power to pursue their 
own interests 
Less power for the board 
to pursue their own 
interests  
Tensions between 
the board and 
shareholders on the 
one hand and the 
shareholder value 
maximisation 
principle on the 
other means that 
short-term decisions 
are more likely 
Tensions between the 
board and 
shareholders on the 
one hand and the 
shareholder value 
maximisation 
principle on the other 
means that short-term 
decisions are more 
likely 
Influence of the majority 
shareholder  on the 
decision-making and the 
fact that decision should 
involve some 
consideration of the 
interests of various 
stakeholders means that 
long-term decisions are 
more likely 
 
The dichotomy between the UK and Delaware, on the one hand and Germany on the other is 
vivid. Similar results for the UK and Delaware were expected owing to their complementary 
corporate objectives and share ownership structures. However, the case studies also show that 
the results are not the same in these jurisdictions, because of the relatively stronger position 
of the board in Delaware and the application of the ESV principle in the UK. The 
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encouragement afforded by the ESV principle to address a wider range of factors in the UK 
places it somewhere between Delaware and Germany in a notional spectrum. In general, 
long-termism in the UK and Delaware is associated more strongly with shareholder interests 
and in Germany with balancing the interests of various stakeholders. Hence, it is evident that 
long-termism is perceived differently in these jurisdictions. 
On balance, it cannot be unequivocally stated that the stakeholder-orientated countries 
are the ultimate exemplars of long-term decision making. However, short-term decisions are 
more likely to be taken in the UK and Delaware due to the shareholder value maximisation 
rule and the agency conflicts between the board and shareholders that are likely to create 
more short-term pressures. In the same vein, Jackson and Pertraki argue that in the Anglo-
Saxon jurisdictions the agency conflicts and shareholder value maximisation feed short-
termism.170 Further, a study carried out in the 1990s on the role of corporate performance 
measures and incentive schemes in Germany and in the UK revealed that ‘a smaller German 
equity market and a closer relationship between banks and their corporate clients’ supports a 
longer-term approach in German companies. 171  What is more, an emphasis on secure 
employment and seniority pay in Germany after the Second World War ‘explains an in-built 
tendency towards long-termism which contributed to higher levels of investment than in the 
English-speaking countries.’172  
Overall, there seems to be a compelling reason to argue that Germany offers greater 
long-term protection, as the legal system values the continuing development of the company 
and a lasting increase in value. Not only the corporate objective but also less visible, 
considerable agency conflicts during decision-making and share ownership structure with a 
strong position of arguably more long-term orientated majority shareholder, demonstrate that 
examples of long-termism (and also short-termism) are stronger in Germany.  
Referring back to the corporate objective in Germany, consideration of the interests of 
various stakeholders appears more long-term orientated, as different points of view are taken 
into consideration. The decision is then analysed from different perspectives and the decision 
is more comprehensive. As a consequence, the perspective in a stakeholder jurisdiction is 
longer, fuller and more far-reaching, even if particular employees, creditors or shareholders 
might have only temporary relationships with the company, or occasionally put short-term 
                                                          
170 Jackson, Petraki, supra n 152, 49. 
171 Jeffrey Coates et al., Challenging Short-termism: The Role of Corporate Performance Measurement Systems 
in the UK and Germany, 1 (CIMA Publishing, 1996). 
172 Plender, supra n 13, 211.  
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pressure on the management board. The practice of considering the interests of various 
stakeholders’ groups make managerial decision-making more accurate and all-embracing. 
On balance, the critique of the stakeholder theory that this theory is too broad to be of 
much use, because it is not possible to define whose interests should actually be taken into 
consideration, must be rebutted at this point. Consideration (or balancing) of the interests of 
various stakeholders is more strongly underlined in Germany, in comparison to the UK and 
Delaware. However, as the ultimate task of the management board in Germany is ensuring 
the company’s profitability (expressed as ‘appropriate profit realisation’ rather than ‘profit 
maximisation’), it is somewhat stretching matters to argue that the corporate objective in 
Germany is too vague. 
Nevertheless, clearly the long-term approach will also have negative implications. 
Long-term orientation in the blockholder jurisdictions, like Germany, means that this system 
will suffer from an excessive growth focus, as it is not aiming at shareholder value 
maximisation. At the same time, market systems like the UK and Delaware are prone to 
short-termism as they do not concentrate on long-term project, but they are able to deliver 
shareholder value.173 Bratton and McCahery argue that each system’s investment minus is 
also its plus and vice versa, which confirms the hypothesis of equal fitness.174 To sum up, the 
aim of this article was to clarify the content and scope of long-termism, using the shareholder 
v. stakeholder debate and share ownership structure of the company as instrumental devices.  
                                                          
173 Bratton, McCahery, supra n 122, 29. 
174 ibid 28-29. 
